THE CONCEPT OF PAÑCAKOŚA AND MUKTI IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

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Introduction

Know thyself - is the ultimate appeal of all the orthodox and heterodox systems of Indian Philosophy. Among the schools of Indian Philosophy Vedanta is wisdom, that has for its aim, the solution of the mystery of all existence. It ignores or discards nothing of human experience. At its highest stage it is pure knowledge. It seeks a true explanation of the whole of existence. It is perennially significant, because it deals with the fundamental problem of human existence i.e., the problem of suffering. Here, I attempt to delineate the problem of Bondage and Liberation in the light of the Five Sheath Principle in Advaita Vedānta.

All the systems of Indian Philosophy are deeply concerned with the problem of suffering. Even the Cārvāka, who is otherwise iconoclastic in his views, considers the avoidance of pain and the enjoyment of pleasure as the Summum bonum of human life.[1] He differs from other Indian philosophers in denying the possibility of a complete and everlasting freedom from suffering (i.e., liberation).[2] He is content with the enjoyment of worldly pleasure which is inseparably associated with pain, as grain with husk.[3] But all other schools of Indian philosophy are not once in believing in the possibility of liberation. Some of them go still further and consider the ideal of liberation as realizable in this very life. Most of the Indian philosophers also agree in maintaining that suffering is due to ignorance and, therefore, salvation can be attained only through knowledge. Even Cārvāka says that man is a victim of worldly sufferings only because he is ignorant of the truth that there is no permanent spiritual substance, no rebirth, no God, no liberation and that the whole world is nothing more than an accidental combination of four material elements. Thus, what is knowledge according to other schools of Indian philosophy is ignorance according to Cārvāka and vice versa. All other systems of Indian Philosophy also hold divergent views in regard to the positive nature of knowledge and the liberation attained thereby. In spite of these differences, the problem of suffering is their common concern.

KOŚAS

'Mukti' which is Sanskrit equivalent of the English word 'liberation',

literally means 'freedom'. In this significance, it is a relative term; it is meaningful only in relation to bondage. To know what is freedom, one has first to know that what is bondage. Bondage, in Advaita Vedānta, means the encirclement of self by not-self. Self is confused with not-self. Not-self is superimposed (i.e., adhyasta) on self. The covering of self by not-self consists of five layers. In the technical terminology of Advaita Vedānta, these layers are known as 'Kosas'.[4] These are named as annamaya (physical), prāṇamaya (vital), manomaya (mental), vijñānamaya (intellectual) and ānandamaya (beatific) kośas (sheaths). The confusion of Self with not-self consisting of five sheaths, results in the superimposition of the qualities of the latter on the former and consequently self appears to be subject to all kinds of sufferings which do not actually pertain to it.

ANNAMAYAKOŚA

Annamayakośa is the first layer of the covering of self by not-self. It signifies the physical body which is sustained by food (i.e., anna), the materialistic theory which identifies self with the physical body, is traced back to the Taittirīyopaniṣad where man is described as 'made up of the extract of food'.[5] The Cārvāka makes capital of this passage and tries his level best to prove his theory that there is no self independent of the physical body. Sensory perception is the only source of valid knowledge, and as no self separate from the physical body is ever perceived, there arises no question of its existence,[6] the material elements, devoid of consciousness in themselves, produce consciousness, when combined in the form of body (i.e., brain), in the same way as the fruit-juice, rice, etc., when made to ferment, give rise to the quality of inebriation, which was not originally in them.[7] The soul is nothing more than the body qualified by consciousness.[8]

The fallacy of the identification of the self with the physical body is not peculiar to the Cārvāka alone. The materialistic theory of self has been much more prevalent in Western thought. We come across three chief forms of materialism in the West, viz., equative materialism, attributive materialism and causal materialism. The advocates of equative materialism like Democritus consider mind as a kind of matter, and mental process as merely a developed form of physical process. According to attributive materialism, mental activity is a quality of matter, which expresses itself when matter assumes the refined form of brain. John Toland defined thought 'as a function of the brain'. Causal materialism considers mind as a product of matter. As the liver secretes bile, similarly the brain produces consciousness. The nerve currents going from

cell to cell in the brain produce a kind of glow and this is consciousness. Thus consciousness is merely a side-effect like the light produced by friction. Hobbes, Huxlery, and modern Behaviorists in psychology advocate this view.

Certain proofs are adduced in favour of the materialistic theory of self. Firstly, scientific observation and experimentation prove that all worldly phenomena consist of atoms; and mind is no exception to it. Secondly, the mental process and the brain processes run parallel, thus psycho-physical parallelism proves that the mind is not separate from and independent of the brain. Thirdly, comparative anatomy establishes the fact that as the nervous system including the brain develops, the mental powers also develop. Man has the most developed brain and hence the highest mental powers. Lastly, the law of conservation of energy also goes in favour of the materialistic view of self. The amount of energy is known to remain constant in the universe. If the mental energy is something else, it ought to increase or decrease the physical energy, but this is not so.

The ethical implications of the materialistic theory of self are very pernicious. It leads us to gross hedonism. When self is confused with annamayakośa i.e., the physical body, the physical pleasure (i.e., kāma) becomes the summum bonum of human life, and the higher values like dharma (virtue) and mokṣa (liberation) are ignored. Thus, the actual order of the values (viz., dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa) is entirely distorted, and man stoops to the low level of an animal.

The Advaita Vedānta is quite conscious of the undesirable consequences of the superimposition (i.e., adhyāsa) of the physical body and its qualities on the self. Śaṅkara considers it as the root cause of all evils and believes that the purport of all the Vedāntic texts is remove this adhyāsa and to lead to the realization of the absolute oneness of the self.[9] The self and the physical body are diametrically opposed to each other in their nature like light and darkness.[10]

Śaṅkara, in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,[11] puts forward the following arguments against the materialistic theory of self. Firstly, had consciousness been a product of material elements, it would have not cognized the material elements.[12] Self is the subject, and the material elements are the objects of knowledge. 'Knower' cannot be produced out of 'known'. Secondly, the physical body is, no doubt, an auxiliary condition of the empirical manifestation of consciousness, but it does not imply that consciousness is a quality of the physical body. Light is a condition of visual perception, but on that ground,

the visual perception cannot be said to be property of light. Nor can the invariable co-existence of body and consciousness be proved, for example, at the time of death, body exists but consciousness does not exist. Lastly, there is a fundamental difference between the properties of body and those of consciousness, e.g., the former and not the latter can be observed by others. In his commentary on the Bṛadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad[13] also, Śaṅkara argues, that if body itself is ātman, there will be no possibility of the remembrance and the co-ordination of different experiences into the form of a coherent knowledge.

In the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi also, the mistaking of the physical body for the self is considered to be the root-cause of all suffering,[14] and for the removal of this mistake the self should be clearly distinguished from the physical body. The self is pure, eternal, one, conscious and the subject of knowledge. The physical body is impure, ever-changing, many in number, unconscious and the object of knowledge.[15]

The Advaita Vedāntic critique of Cārvāka materialism gives a silencing reply to the contentions of the Western thinkers, ancient and modern, who endeavour to refute the existence of the self, independent of body, on the ground of psycho-physical parallelism, comparative anatomy and the law of the conservation of energy. Though the modern scientists consider energy as the primary stuff of the universe, what exactly is the real nature of this energy is still an enigma to them. Many Physicists like Whitehead, Eddington and James Jeans, favour an idealistic view. Abiogenesis or spontaneous growth of life out of lifeless matter has never been proved experimentally. Life comes out of life and never out of lifeless objects. Mind shows spontaneity, freedom of choice, purpose, intelligence etc. and these can never be explained in mechanical terms.

PRĀṆAMAYAKOŚA

Prāṇamayakośa (i.e. the vital sheath) is the next layer in the encirclement of self by not-self. The five vital airs, (i.e. prāṇas), along with the organs of action (i.e. karmendriya), constitute the vital sheath.[16] It is a product of rajoguṇa and is, therefore, endowed with activity. Some Cārvākas argue that the prāṇamayakośa is the self, because the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (2.2) says so: "There is another inner self made up of vital airs", because in the absence of vital airs the sense-organs become inactive, and lastly because of the experience 'I am hungry', 'I am thirsty'[17] the laymen having little knowledge of physiology also examine the motion of vital airs to ascertain if a man is dead or alive, and thus seem to identify self with the vital airs.

The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi rightly contends that prāṇa cannot be the self. Prāṇa is merely a modification of air. It goes inwards and outwards like air. It is determined. It is incapable of knowing anything, desirable or undesirable, itself or the other.[18] Thus, prāṇa, which is itself an object of knowledge, cannot be the self which is the subject of knowledge.

MANOMAYAKOŚA

Manomayakośa (i.e., mental sheath) is the third layer in the encirclement of self by not-self. Mind, together with the organs of sense, forms the mental sheath.[19] It has the faculty of desire.[20] This sheath is constituted by the volitions directed to selfish ends. The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi gives a detailed description of Manomayakośa. This sheath is the cause of the feeling of 'I' 'mine', etc.[21]

Some Cārvākas identify self with the Manomayakośa because of the passage in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (2.3) where it is said: 'There is another inner self made up of the mind', because when the mind sleeps, the vital airs cease to be; and because of the experience, 'I resolve', 'I doubt'.[22] Most of the Western thinkers also do not distinguish between the self and the mind. Even the Naiyāyikas, who draw a clear-cut distinction between the mind and the self, fall a prey to the fallacy of super-imposing the mental functions like desire on the self.

The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi ably performs the noble task of removing (i.e., apavāda) the superimposition of the mental sheath and its qualities on the self. The mind cannot be the self, because it has a beginning and an end: it is ever changing, it is qualified by suffering; and it is the object of knowledge.[23] The self, on the other hand, is beginningless and endless, eternal, not qualified by suffering, and the subject of knowledge. Hence there should be no confusion between the subject (draṣṭā, i.e., self) and the object (dṛśya, i.e., mind) of knowledge. As mind is ignorance incarnate, it is the root cause of man's bondage and his worldly sufferings,[24] and, therefore the removal of the superimposition of the mental sheath and its qualities on the self is essential for the attainment of liberation.

Śaṅkara vehemently criticize the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view in which the mental qualities like desire are superimposed on the self. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers consider pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, etc., as the special qualities of the self.[25] Śaṅkara objects that no relation can be established between desires, aversion, etc., on the one hand and the self on the other hand. The relation cannot be the intimate union (samavāya) of the inseparable entities (ayutasiddha), for the soul, being eternal, exists even before the desires etc.,

comes into existence. If the self and the desires etc. are considered to be inseparable, the latter would be eternal like the former and there would remain no possibility of liberation. In fact, empirical qualities like pleasure, pain, desire and aversion are impermanent and ever-changing and if they are the real attributes of the self, the latter would also be impermanent and subject to imperfections.[26] Pleasure and pain etc. . . . Śaṅkara continues, cannot be the real qualities of the soul, because the former are the objects of perceptual experience, but not the latter.[27]

VIJÑĀNAMAYAKOŚA

The next layer in the encasement of self by not-self is Vijñānamayakośa. The intellect, together with the sense organs forms the intellectual sheath. This sheath consists of the intellectual functions. Discriminative knowledge, which depends upon the distinction of subject and object, constitutes the intellectual sheath. This sheath, which fancies itself to be an agent and a patient, and passes to and fro between this and the other world (i.e., a transmigrating soul) is called the empirical self (i.e., vyāvahārika Jīva).[28]

In the analysis of human experience, many thinkers fail to go deeper than the intellectual sheath. The modern psychologistics also reduce the whole human experience to three faculties of conation, affection and cognition, and thus stop at the intellectual sheath. According to the Vedāntasāra, a Buddhist identifies self with the intellect on the basis of the scriptural text (Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 2.4), 'There is another inner self made up of cognition.' In support of this theory of intellect as self, the Buddhist also argues that in the absence of an agent (i.e., kartā), an instrument becomes powerless, and that everyone, has the experience 'I am an agent', I am an experiencer (bhoktā).[29]

The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi makes a thorough going analysis of vijñānamayakośa and demonstrates that there is no logical ground for identifying self with this kośa. This sheath is the modification of prakṛti (i.e., māyā); its existence is due to the reflection of Pure consciousness. It generates the feelings like 'I am knower' and 'I am doer'. It is the cause of transmigration. It functions as jīva. Being impelled by past impressions, it does many kinds of actions, good and bad, and experiences their results accordingly. The states of waking, dreaming, etc., belong to it. It experiences pleasure and pain. It, in the sense of internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa), is the adjunct (upādhi) of self. The vijñānanamayakośa is also included in not-self. Being a modification of prakṛti, it is unconscious, finite and impermanent. It is also an object of experience.

For these reasons, it should not be confused with self.[30]

ĀNANDAMAYAKOŚA

The last layer in the encirclement of self by not-self is the ānandamayakośa, i.e., the beatific sheath or the sheath of bliss. It is constituted by the distributive ignorance. The individual nescience is called 'the sheath of bliss', because it abounds in bliss and covers (self) like a sheath.[31]

In the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, we find a more detailed description of ānandamayakośa. This sheath consists of the reflection of the pure bliss of Ātman or self. In it, tamoguṇa is predominant. It is manifested in the pleasure consequent on the attainment of one's desired objects. It expresses itself completely in the state of sound sleep, whereas its manifestation in waking and dreaming states is only partial.[32]

Some Mīmāmsakas mistake ānandamayakośa for self.[33] In support of their view, they cite certain passages of the Upaniṣads.[34] Besides the scriptural testimony, the fact of sound sleep in which intellect etc., merge in ignorance and the statements like 'I am ignorant' also according to the Mīmāmsakas, prove the identity of self with ānandamayakośa.

The view of self as identical with ānandamayakośa arises from the ignorance of the real nature of self. Against this view the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi rightly objects that ānandamayakośa is a finite modification of prakṛti; it is an effect of good deeds; it is dependent on the gross physical body; and therefore, it cannot be identified with the supreme self.[35] Sound sleep state contains the latent seeds of the worldly experience, which necessarily implies the schema of knower and known. Then how can it be identical with the self which is free from all kinds of distinction.

The core of the whole discussion undertaken in the present paper is that according to Advaita Vedānta bondage is the confusion of self with non-self, and liberation is the freedom of self from not-self. Bondage is caused by superimposition of not-self on self (i.e., adhyāropa), and the liberation is brought about by the removal of this superimposition (i.e., apavāda). As by removing the husk, grain is acquired, in the same way by removing the five sheaths, the real nature of self is realized.[36] There is no way other than self-realisation which can lead a man to salvation.[37]

Vidyāraṇya also demonstrates that there is no raison detre for the theories which identify self with any of the five sheaths. The sheaths are diametrically opposed to self in their nature. They are fleeting, whereas self is permanent. In dream, the annamayakośa i.e., the physical body is sublated.

The subtle body consisting of three sheaths, viz. the vital, mental and the intellectual, is not manifest in sleep. The beatific sheath, i.e., the causal body consisting of ignorance, vanishes in the state of superconsciousness (Samādhi). Thus, none of the five sheaths is permanent, whereas the self (i.e., pure consciousness) eternal; it persists in all the states of human life, viz. waking, dreaming, sleeping and meditating (Samādhi). Furthermore, while the sheaths are finite and particular, the self is infinite and universal.[38]

The physical sheath is a modification of matter. The vital sheath is unintelligent, a blind force. The mental sheath is also a mode of māyā; it is subject to ceaseless change. The intellectual sheath is sublated in sleep and the beatific sheath in Samadhi. Therefore, self cannot be identified with any of the five sheaths.[39]

MUKTI

Most of the other Indian philosophers are inconsonance with Advaita Vedāntins in maintaining that salvation can be attained only through the discrimination of self from not-self (i.e., viveka). According to Jainism, liberation is a state of the pristine purity of self, in which it becomes free from the bondage of Karma-matter and attains the four-fold perfection (anantacatuṣṭaya), viz. infinite knowledge, infinite faith, infinite power and infinite bliss. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in liberation the self exists as a pure substance free from all connection with the body, neither suffering pain, nor enjoying pleasure, nor having consciousness even. This state can be attained only through the realization of the true nature of the self as distinct from the body and all other objects.[40] Sāṅkhya Yoga also considers liberation as a state in which the self is established in its on nature.[41] The discrimination of self from not-self is the only means to the attainment of liberation.[42]

Though all the systems of Indian Philosophy, except Cārvāka, subscribe to the common principle that liberation is attainable only through the knowledge of self which distinguish it from not-self, yet they give different answers to the question, 'what is the true nature of the self?'. All other schools of Indian Philosophy, except Advaita Vedānta, try to apprehend the nature of self through this or that category of intellect. Most of them look at it through the schema of substance and quality. The Jainas wrongly consider self as extended, and the Naiyāyikas as a substance essentially devoid of consciousness. The Sāṅkhyas confuse self with empirical selves, when they superimpose the qualities of the latter on the former and on that basis try to prove the plurality of selves. Thus, these schools actually fail to distinguish

self from not-self. It is the Advaita Vedānta which succeeds in fulfilling the noble task of removing all the superimpositions of not-self on self. It is only by discriminating in thought (viveka) between the five different kośas that we can find our true self beyond physical, vital, mental, intellectual and beatific sheaths.[43]

The Indian concept of liberation brings out the spiritualistic outlook of Indian philosophy. The highest ideal of human life, according to Indian philosophers, is Mokṣa which consists in the stationing of self in its true nature. The other ideals, viz. dharma, artha and kāma, are only subsidiary to Mokṣa. Sense-organs, mind and intellect are only instruments (karaṇa)[44] to serve the purpose of self. The physical body is a chariot riding which self reaches its destination, i.e., liberation.

Modern man's agony is due to his de-spiritualisation, brought about by the excessive technological sophistication. He is in complete oblivion of his true self. Self has been confused with its sheaths, mainly with the physical sheath. Consequently, all the attention is being paid to the fulfillment of physical needs. Kāma (gratification of desires) has emerged as the highest ideal of human life. Artha (wealth) is being feverishly accumulated for the satisfaction of kāma. Dharma (virtue) has been relegated to a status subordinate to artha and kāma. The intellect (i.e., the vijñānamayakośa) is being pressed into the service of the psychical sheath. Intellect has become a maid servant of the body. Modern man's mind is always occupied with devising means and ways to fulfil his physical needs. The material world is too much with him. He is feeding the body at the cost of his soul. He has lost all the mental peace. Life is a burden to him. Materialism has thus become a bane of his life.

CONCLUSION

Thus in this dismal situation, Indian Philosophy in general and Advaita Vedānta in particular can serve as a beacon light for modern man. It exhorts him to employ his intellect in the service of his self and not in that of his body. True philosophy is the intellectual reflection (manana) which leads man to spiritual realization (darśana). Modern man is suffering because he is immersed in the quagmire of materialism. He has identified himself with what he is not. For his freedom from all kinds of sufferings, he has nothing to do but only to realize his true self by distinguishing it from not-self. Nothing new is to be attained, but only the concealed truth is to be discovered. This discovery marks a turning point in man's life. He becomes a different man; he is, in a sense, reborn (dvija). There is no material change in the outlook. Both with

this change in the outlook, freedom from all kinds of worldly sufferings is attained. All sufferings are due to wrong perspectives, and as soon as the wrong perspective is replaced by the right one, all sufferings vanish. It is the Reality which is visualized in spiritual intuition (ādhyātmika anubhūti). The Advaita Vedāntic conception of mukti is not an eschatological ideal which is to attained after death; rather it is realizable here in this very life. For its attainment, nothing is to be done except realizing self as quite distinct from not-self. As a result of this self-realisation, all the sufferings, caused by the superimposition of not-self on self, vanish. When self is realized to be distinct from not-self, consisting of body, vital airs, mind, intellect and ignorance, it is no more perturbed by the imperfections pertaining to the not-self. Thus, the Advaita Vedāntic conception of mukti can serve as a panacea for all the sufferings of modern man.

(Footnotes)

1. सुखमेव पुरुषार्थः—वर्जनीयतया प्राप्तस्य दुःखस्य परिहारेण सुखमात्रस्यैव भोक्तव्यत्वात्। Sarvadarśanasaṅgrahaḥ, Chapter I, p. 5.

2. देहच्छेदो मोक्षः, Ibid., Chapter I, p. 8.

3. त्याज्यं सुखं विषयसङ्गमजन्म पुंसाम्, दुःखोपसृष्टमिति मूर्खविचारणैषा, Ibid, Chapter I, p. 6.

4. कोशवदाच्छादकत्वात्। Vedāntasāra, p . 110.

5. स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः। Tai. Up. *II.1.1.*

6. देहातिरिक्त आत्मनि प्रमाणाभावात्। Sarvadarśanasaṅgrahaḥ, Chapter I, p. 4.

7. तेभ्य एव देहाकारपरिणतेभ्यः किण्वादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवच्चैतन्यमुपजायते। Ibid., Chapter I, p. 4.

8. चैतन्यविशिष्टदेह एवात्मा। Ibid., Chapter I, p. 4.

9. अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणायात्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते। Adhyāsabhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra, I.1.1.

10. तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोः। Ibid., I.1.1.

11. व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावाभावित्वान्नतूपलब्धिवत्। Ibid., III.3.54.

12. न हि भूतभौतिकधर्मेण सता चैतन्येन भूतभौतिकानि विषयीक्रियेरन्। —तस्मादनवहतं देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽस्तित्वम्। BSSB., III.3.54.

13. स्वप्नस्मृत्योर्दृष्टस्यैव दर्शनात्। यदि हि देहस्यैव दर्शनादिक्रिया स्वप्ने दृष्टस्यैव दर्शनं न स्यात्। SB. Br. Up. IV.3.6.

14. देहात्मधीरेव — जन्मादिदुःखप्रभवस्य बीजम्। Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, stanza 166.

15. Ibid., 156-158.

16. Ibid., 167; cf. Vedāntasāra, p. 66.

17. Vedāntasāra, p. 11.

18. Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, stanza 168.

19. Vedāntasāra, p. 7.

20. Ibid., p. 8.

21. Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, stanza 169.

22. Vedāntasāra, p. 11.

23. मनोमयो नापि भवेत्परात्मा
ह्याद्यन्तवत्वात् परिणामिभावात्।
दुःखात्मकत्वात् विषयत्वहेतोः
द्रष्टा हि दृश्यात्मतया न दृष्टः।। Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, stanza 185.

24. न ह्यस्त्यविद्या मनसोऽतिरिक्ता
मनो ह्यविद्या भवबन्धहेतुः।
तस्मिन् विनष्टे सकलं विनष्टं
विजृम्भितेऽस्मिन् सकलं विजृम्भते।। Ibid, 171.

25. (१) सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्चात्मनो लिङ्गानि। Kaṇāda, Vaiśeṣikasūtra, III.2.4.

(२) बुद्ध्यादयोऽस्त्वात्ममात्रविशेषगुणाः। Annambhaṭṭa, Tarkasaṅgraha, Ed. By Y. V. Athalye, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1963, section 73.

(३) बुद्ध्यादयो नव विशेषगुणाः। Keśavamiśra, Tarkabhāṣā with the commentary of Acarya Visvesvara, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 1953, p. 90.

26. इच्छादिभ्योऽनित्येभ्यः आत्मनो नित्यस्य पूर्वसिद्धत्वान्नायुतसिद्धत्वोपपत्तिः। आत्मनो अयुतसिद्धत्वे च इच्छादीनामात्मगतमहत्त्ववान्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। स चानिष्टः। आत्मनोऽनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात्। इच्छाद्युपजनापायवद्गुणवत्वे च आत्मनोऽनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। SB. Ma. Kā. III.5.

27. SB, Bh. Up. I.3.7.

28. अयं कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वसुखित्वदुःखित्वाद्यभिमानत्वेनेहलोकपरलोकगामी व्यावहारिको जीव इत्युच्यते। Vedāntasāra, p. 65.

29. Ibid., p. 11.

30. Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, stanzas 186-208.

31. आनन्दप्रचुरत्वात्कोशवदाच्छादकत्वाच्च आनन्दमयकोश इति। Vedāntasāra, p. 33.

32. The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, stanzas 209, 210.

33. Vedāntasāra, p. 12.

34. अन्योऽन्तरात्मा आनन्दमयः। Tai. Up. II.5.

35. नैवायमानन्दमयः परात्मा सोपाधिकत्वात् प्रकृतेर्विकारात्।
कार्यत्वहेतोः सुकृतक्रियाया विकारसंघातसमाहितत्वात्।। V.C. stanza 221.

36. अन्नमयादिभ्य आनन्दमयान्तेभ्य आत्मभ्योऽभ्यन्तरतमं ब्रह्म विद्यया प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन दिदर्शयिषु शास्त्रं अविद्याकृतपञ्चकोशापनयेन अनेकतुषकोपद्रववितुषीकरणेनेव तदन्तर्गततण्डुलान्प्रस्तौति, तस्माद्वा एतस्मादन्नरसमयादित्यादि। SB, Tai. Up. II.2.

37. नान्योऽस्ति पन्था भवबन्धमुक्तेर्विना स्वतत्त्वावगमं मुमुक्षोः। Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 224.

38. Pañcadaśi with commentary of Ramakrishna Pandita, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 2002.

39. *Ibid.*, *III*.3.10.

40. अपवर्गे शान्तः खल्वयं सर्वविप्रयोगः सर्वोपरमोऽपवर्गः। Vātsyāyanabhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtras, I.1,2.

41. पुरुषार्थशून्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यम्, स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तेरिति। Yogasūtra IV.33.

42. ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो। Sāṅkhyakārikā 44.

43. पञ्चानामपि कोशानां निषेधे युक्तितः कृते।
तन्निषेधावधिः साक्षी बोधरूपोऽवशिष्यते।। V.C. stanza 212.

44. साधकतमं कारणं करणम्। Aṣṭādhyāyī I.4.42.

"Knowable realities of nature cannot be exhaustively discovered by any branch of science for Science is never in a position completely and exhaustively to explain the problem it has to face."

Max Planck