

Pain without Gain? : Land Assembly and Acquisition for Infrastructure Mega Projects : The Indian experience with the Bangalore International Airport

Kalpana Gopalan

Doctoral Candidate, Centre for Public Policy, Indian Institute of Management, Bannerghatta Road, Bangalore 560 076

Abstract

This comprehensive case study on Bangalore International Airport enumerates in a sequence, in stages and phases the role of people involved who finally make up a mega project. Episodes of people, evaluation of process, procedures and systems and the final call of polity are dilated with precision. The complexities of a mega project make impact on future generation. A recount of these will be utility oriented experience and learning.

Key Words & Phrases: Context, Brand, Bangalore, Evaluation, Corporates, Civil Society & Political Voices.

1. Introduction

1.1 Public Private Partnerships as a Policy Option

Public Private Partnerships (ppps) are attracting considerable attention in both scholarly and policy discourses. Politicians, policy makers, bankers, scholars, researchers the world over are talking about them. Industrial countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands, have adopted ppp arrangements to provide infrastructure, education, health, water supply, waste management, and other public services. The growing demand of a vocal public for better infrastructure services, coupled with constrained government budgets, has made ppps an attractive public policy option. As Greve & Hodge state "ppps are now an increasingly relevant and popular

public policy option throughout the world. They may even symbolize the new relationship between the citizen and the state" (Greve & Hodge, 2005).

In spite of ppps attracting widespread media attention, there is very little clarity in the public mind about what is a Public Private Partnership. There is certainly no consensus about what outcomes we can expect from a successful ppp, or how we can execute them successfully, not just in the popular or policy discourse but even in scholarly debates about the subject. Are ppps a passing fad, or will they evolve into a useful public policy tool? If ppps are here to stay, we need to learn how to make them work. Academic scholarship has not addressed this imperative, and praxis is still grappling with it.

1.2 Statement of Purpose

Hammersley states that all qualitative research should be “relevant to some legitimate public concern” (Hammersley, 1992). The purpose of my study is to examine two critical issues in the experience of Bangalore International Airport (hereinafter BIAL). These are (a) the decision relating to the location of the airport and (b) the controversy that broke out to retain the former HAL airport as a civilian airport even after opening of the BIA. Though divided in time, these interlinked episodes give us an insight into the kind of issues that can arise while implementing large infrastructure ppps in the Indian context. My approach helps to explicate the contemporary dilemmas that governments face in the changing economic globalized scenario today- balancing the traditional workings of political and bureaucratic practice and tested systems of public accountability to the new, at times conflicting and contradictory, demands of private foreign systems. My work involves three levels of analysis, the national context, the sub-national local context and the project level. Borrowing concepts from Public Policy, Economics, Organization Theory and Finance/Law, as well as a practical understanding of policy processes and political realities, I utilize an integrative framework and a case study design to highlight the interplay of forces, actors and arguments in megaprojects such as BIAL.

In line with my research purpose, my work aspires to address a dual audience of public policymaker and the interested academic. Indeed, given the public interest and larger impact of ppps, members of an intelligent citizenry are an equally appropriate audience. Locke & Golden-Biddle support this approach when they say: “In an applied discipline we essentially have two audiences for our work. Presumably, we would like not only academics but also practicing managers to read and comment on our work” (2007). More so as the world is not waiting, but going ahead with implementing ppps.

1.3 Defining the Boundaries

ppp is an umbrella term loosely used to describe a variety of associations between the public, private and non-governmental actors. The subject of my study

is the classic infrastructure public private partnership, distinguished by a long-term, whole-of-lifecycle, contractual collaborative arrangement between a government entity and one or more private sector firms, whereby private parties finance, build and operate an infrastructure project or deliver public infrastructure-based services with shared decision-making, risks and responsibilities with the government entity (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004) (Boardman, Poschmann, & Vining, 2005).

1.4 Significance of the Study

My research is motivated by the objective of making a contribution to ppp literature by way of an integrative, developing country oriented, cross-disciplinary approach, blending theory and praxis, and incorporating policy and process factors. I also aspire to make an intelligent doable contribution to the designing and practical implementation of ppps by highlighting issues that are of relevance to the practitioner and the policymaker. Even as ppps emerge as a popular public policy option, the management and governance challenges confronting its implementation remain. ppps seem to have provided only limited opportunity for meaningful levels of transparency and public participation. Issues such as lack of transparency, insufficient capacity in the bureaucracy and polity and a poor institutional framework are challenges which the practitioner confronts, but neither policy nor scholarship pay attention to. This makes it imperative to streamline processes so that risks are managed and an enabling climate for successful ppps is created. As Mason states: “In the simplest terms the question is ‘What is my research for?’ In thinking about answering this question the researcher should consider not only familiar academic arguments about increasing or challenging intellectual and theoretical understanding, plugging gaps in knowledge, extending debate and so on, but also issues about the socio-political context of the research practice. Researchers need to ask questions about the socio-political context of research directly. By advocating that researchers think about these issues I am arguing that you should confront and engage with the politics of social research rather than assume it is possible to maintain a safe distance” (2002)

2. Mapping the Terrain: A Review of Literature

2.1 Categorizing PPP Literature

Scholarly literature on Public Private Partnerships can broadly be categorized into two groups: (a) conceptual pieces that deal with ppps as an economic, and/or organizational entity (b) contextual descriptive case studies of particular projects or policies. The evolution of ppp literature was influenced by three factors: first, ppps are still a nascent phenomenon in most countries, in particular developing economies; second, this is an area where “theory is yet to catch up with practice” (Allan, 2001); third, ppps have evoked interest in several disciplines, including economics, public policy, law, finance and organization theory, but with little cross-fertilization. We take a brief look at the history of ppp literature and major works, then examine key themes and conclude with a critique of its deficiencies.

The interest in ppps first manifested in Special Editions of academic journals such as *Accountability Quarterly* (May 2002), *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal* ((2003: 16:3), *American Behavioral Scientist* (1999) and *Australian Accounting Review* (2004: 13: 2). A number of compiled volumes were published, and early edited editions include Osborne(2000), Perrot & Chatelus (2000) and Berg et al (2002) dealing with theoretical insights and empirical evidence from around the globe.

As understanding ppps became central to the challenges facing public policymaking, the number of studies on ppps grew. Rosenau’s early volume (2000), adopted an approach linking different thematic perspectives to different sectors. It explored the inter-sectoral relationships between public and private organizations across several policy arenas. However, the downside of such splintered understanding is that individual clarity is offset by the lack of a generalizable comprehension of what works and what does not in a ppp context.

Grimsey & Lewis (2005) provided a comprehensive volume of studies related to the concept and practice of public private partnerships. Their introduction to the volume reviews existing literature in detail (2005, pp. xiii-xiv). They analyze the multiple and changing meanings of the ppp as an idea, its distinctive

characteristics, and an analysis of the ppp from four perspectives: the changing market for public services, the private financing model, the organization of ppps and risk management. Other comprehensive volumes include Hodge & Greve (2005), whose edited volume furthers our understanding on theoretical underpinnings of ppps and aims to draw lessons from empirical studies. The volume throws considerable light on ppps, but, considering the variety of perspectives and understandings in just three hundred odd pages, it is the diffused light of a spectrum that illuminates their ppp, not the bright prismatic coherence of a single lens.

The Indian experience has received scholarly attention in Kamath’s 2006 dissertation (Kamath, 2006) and Sharma’s 2008 publication (Sharma, 2008), both studies of individual cases. The former is a detailed case study of a public-private partnering experience of the Bangalore Agenda Task Force. The latter is a practitioner’s account of the Kutch Railway Corporation.

Finally, there is a wide world of public opinion out there. This is a literature which cannot be ignored by any researcher who concerns herself with an institution so entwined with public interest. The public perception on ppps, the notion as well as the doing of it, is expressed in a variety of publications: government documents, legislative and parliamentary debates, media in newspapers, periodicals, electronic media and blogs. Each describes the ppp as they see it, offering the interested reader one perspective of this multifaceted entity called the ppp. All and each of these have informed this paper.

2.2 Deficiencies in the Literature

Taken together, the literature gives us an intelligent and varied perspective on public private partnerships. However, as ppp literature developed separately along conceptual and empirical traditions, with little cross-fertilization between the two streams, research became less grounded and more speculative in consequence. The fit between theory and practice becomes more and more elusive as the literature continues to follow these independent trajectories. Research which marries the theoretical concept of ppps to the practice and process on the field is therefore essential.

Second, though ppps have evoked interest from several disciplines, each disciplinary tradition examines through its own lens and vocabulary, often resulting in a blinkered vision which ignores vital issues. A comprehensive analysis of ppps mandates a holistic and inclusive vision, operationalised in an integrative framework, subsuming disciplinary differences, what Lorraine et al call “a lack of boundaries” (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2002).

Third, the extant literature largely relates to developed economies. ppp implications for developing economies are critical, but literature on developing country experience is sparse. As they are still an emerging phenomenon in developing economies, there is much less theoretical and empirical research conducted on these institutions. There is, for instance, as yet no single comprehensive scholarly study on the Indian experience of the classical ppp arrangement in the infrastructure sector.

Fourth, the noise surrounding the concept of ppps has import for the study of practice. Since almost anything goes by the name of ppp, a study of a loose governance arrangement like the Bangalore Agenda Task Force in Bangalore, India (Kamath, 2006) considers itself as much a treatise on ppps as an examination of more conservative, classical models (Boardman, Poschmann, & Vining, 2005). While this versatility is part of the attraction of ppps for policymakers, its practitioner relevance would remain elusive unless backed by a clear understanding of the ppp as an organizational entity with a set of distinctive characteristics. Also, the inescapable sectoral and locational contextuality of the ppp is such that any prescriptions or descriptions would be incomplete without an in-depth study of local governance processes and practices. The process approach, which is a feature of public policy research, needs to be incorporated into the study of ppps.

3. Search Design and Methodology

3.1 Rationale for a Qualitative Paradigm

I propose to use a qualitative approach and case study design in this paper. According to Yin, “using case studies for research purposes remains one of the most challenging of social science endeavours” (2003). My choice is motivated by the following reasons:

- In the case of a public policy question the handling of the issue and the perceptions surrounding it are largely context bound, that is, the issue cannot be divorced from its context. The paper is India-centric, and the analytical strategy is centered on a dialectical movement from the case study to the broader policy context to more universal analytic generalizations.
- ppps are a nascent phenomenon and hence there is an exploratory quality to this work; the focus of the research is equally on outcomes (the “what” question) and processes (the “how” question).
- A qualitative approach is suitable when the issue is significant or crucial for organizations and/or theory; but “existing research either does not address the research question at all, or does so in a way that is inadequate or likely to be untrue” (Eisenhardt, 1989) (Creswell, 1994, pp. 4-10) (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 1-2) (Yin, 2003) (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p 26). The particular niche I wish to fill, a study of empirical phenomenon in a developing economy context, is yet unexplored.
- I intend to use my knowledge of theory and integrate it with my experience of practice. The issues under study are of considerable public interest. In an applied discipline like public policy there are diverse audiences for my work. My intended audience includes scholars, practitioners, policy makers and even members of an interested public. Hence it is important that my work is *convincing* to my audience. “The findings from qualitative studies have a quality of “undeniability”. Words, especially organized into incidents or stories, have a vivid concrete meaningful flavor that often proves far more convincing to a reader- researcher, a policymaker, a practitioner-than pages of summarized numbers” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 1).

3.2 Choice of Case for Study

I have chosen the Bangalore International Airport for my study for the following reasons.

- The case is a *critical* case. It was among the earliest ppps in the country, the first ppp in Karnataka and the first in the Civil Aviation sector; hence it served as a


model and forerunner for future ppps. The sense that this project is a pioneering one runs throughout in its history and in the testimonies of documents and respondents. It permits logical generalization and maximum application to other cases.

- BIAL is a *typical* case that displays the distinctive characteristics of an infrastructure ppp; it also exhibits many features that are common to transnational projects; the issues it throws up find reflections in literature across countries; "it highlights what is normal or average" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 28).
- bial is a *politically significant* case. BIAL's genesis and implementation were politically conditioned, it draws attention to politically significant issues, it has had considerable impact on the political processes of the state and the country, and been impacted by them. It is therefore expected that the findings would be analytically generalizable across projects in India, and the world (Yin, 2003, pp. 39-41).

3.3 Analytic Strategy

The main unit of my study is the PPP project, that is, BIAL. However, in keeping with my belief of the importance of the context in determining public policy issues, the local context in which the policy process played out, as well as the national context that forms the larger background, will both be the subject of my study. "In fact, as Yin points out, cases may have sub-cases "embedded" within them" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 26). This strategy of embeddedness also links my units of analysis the three main theatres in the bial saga, the SPV, viz. bial, the State Government of Karnataka, and the Union Government of India.

Fig 1 : Embedded Case Study



My primary data sources are archival records, governmental documents, site visits, media reports and interviews.

4. The Context

"Understanding the context, political, economic and cultural, in which the case study is embedded, is vital in a world where cultural barriers are becoming permeable" (Kamath, 2006). Beginning with changes in global discourse we move on to national and local factors pertinent to this megaproject, and finally take a brief look at the project itself.

4.1 The Background : The New Economy

Around the 1980's, winds of change swept over the way governments conducted their business. Nicknamed 'Thatcherism' and 'Reagonomics' after the political leaders who spearheaded it, the new wave was most powerfully felt in the UK and the USA, but left its mark on most countries of the world, including India. This New Public Management articulated a need to radically transform the way governments operate, bringing in not just the ethos of the private sector, but also actively involve the private sector in the business of governance. What was signal about npm was that it did not stop with debate and discussion, but entered the realm of political practice. Countries like the UK and New Zealand went the farthest, privatizing public sector organizations, downsizing bureaucracy, tackling not just public sector unions but also an influential body of economists who felt that under massive privatization, equity and social justice would suffer.

Except certain western economies with a tradition of privatism and a developed private sector, most economies, particularly developing ones, could not shift to a completely privatized economy. The political and social costs were too great in a scenario of electoral politics. So, rather than complete privatization, governments experimented with alternative mechanisms such as outsourcing or contracting to bring private sector efficiency without eliminating government's role as provider of public services. This contributed to an increasing role for private sector management and finance in areas traditionally the

domain of government, such as infrastructure and public services delivery.

4.2 The National Context : India

India, anxious both to retain its socialist heritage and yet not lose out on the gains of capitalism, adopted a gradualist approach, liberalized its economy in 1991, bringing the public sector down a notch or two from the 'commanding heights' of the economy. The ideology of the new economy found a fertile breeding ground in India because the slow growth of the economy and the sluggishness of the public delivery system was attributed to state failure; while the opening up and marketization of the economy was credited with more recent successes in attracting foreign investment and growth (Sinha, 2005). There was a shift from the prevalent anti-capitalist discourse into a perception of private sector as the engine of growth, and a belief that the injection of much needed private sector efficiency would improve public working. A growing focus on infrastructure provision to cater to corporate demands also characterized the new liberalized state. Literature observes that the internationalization of nations drives a development impetus that is outwardly oriented, extending beyond national boundaries, and attached to larger global economic linkages (Olds, 1999) (Jessop, 2003) (Kamath, 2006). This attempt to reach out to the outer, presumably better world, is manifest in policy and investment choices of societies and governments. In such a scenario, infrastructure mega-projects such as an international airport become an expression of such an aspiration.

4.3 The Sub-National Context : The State of Karnataka

While national policy set the parameters within which growth occurred, sub-national governments began taking advantage of those opportunities for growth (Ferguson, 1990) (Kamath, 2006). One fallout of liberalization was the concentration of foreign investment in a few states, and the resultant competition between them in attracting investments. This was assisted by the growing political importance of regional political parties as players on the national stage. Thus there was a move from a strongly centralized

national state to one in which sub-national state governments play an increasingly autonomous and developmental role.

Through the 1980s and 1990s, the growing importance of sub-national governments in the political and developmental process led to the greater influence of sub-national leadership. Rudolph & Rudolph note that in the continuing drama of liberalization, State Chief Ministers play leading roles. "They are seen on front pages, covers of news magazines and television screens, making and breaking coalition governments, welcoming foreign statesmen and investors, dealing with natural disasters and domestic violence" (2001, p. 1541). The overall framework within which development took place grew out of the interaction and negotiation between key actors representing the central government, the sub-national government and regional élites.

Karnataka in early-2000 was symptomatic of this trend. The new Congress government that came to power in 1999 emphasized governance reform, attracting investment and marketization, with primary focus on the corporate sector. The advent of this change was heralded as "the death knell of status quoism and the onset of reform and change" (Deccan Herald, 2001). Post-liberalization, sub-national economic policy also saw a shift from balanced regional development and poverty alleviation to industrial facilitation and emphasis on a few global centers of the future (Kundu, 2000, p. 9) (Kamath, 2006). The attempt to 'sell' a city as a desirable investment destination became a legitimate public activity, resulting in the emergence of unique city identities.

4.4 The City : Brand Bangalore

A new idea of 'Brand Bangalore' began to make the rounds in the 1990s, nationally and internationally. The advantages of liberalization were availed by a largely IT based private sector in Bangalore, which took over the reins of growth, at least in the public imagination. Their outward orientation led to a spurt of software based industries with multinational collaboration. Infosys, Wipro and a host of fledgling enterprises propelled the transnational operations and

growing reputation of the city. The middle classes, who formed the bulk of the IT white-collar workforce, benchmarked Bangalore against cities in the west and were impatient of its lack of infrastructural amenities. So there was a real infrastructure deficit, and a strong perception of governance deficit. Consequently, the government found it imperative to establish its commitment to improving infrastructure and retaining Bangalore's premier position as the technology capital of India. The creation of a new urban landscape was characterized by certain flagship projects, which "are the material expression of a developmental logic that views megaprojects and place marketing as means for generating future growth and for waging a competitive struggle to attract investment capital" (Swyngedouw, 1989)(Swyngedouw *et al*, 2002) (Short *et al*, 1993) (Hall & Hubbard, 1996) (Kamath, 2006).

The launching of mega-projects and PPPS were thus the visible symbols of reform for a Chief Minister who preferred the sobriquet of CEO. A number of task forces marked the entry of non-state actors into the 'business' of governance. "In Bangalore, for instance, the infrastructure and funding focus has been on the construction of ring roads that surround the city, the development of a Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor, and the construction of an International Airport." (Benjamin, 2000) (Kamath, 2006). "Public Private Participation was the running thread throughout the administration" (Additional Secretary to the Chief Minister, (Deccan Herald, 2001). One of the main planks on which the government was based, therefore, was the concept of ppps and this public-private interaction, the Chief Minister stated, was the key to his success (DeccanHerald, 2002).

4.5 The Sector : Civil Aviation

As Bangalore and its landscape were metamorphosing into modernity, changes were taking at the national level in the Civil Aviation sector.

• The Policy Scenario

For many years since its inception in 1911, the Indian aviation industry was plagued by inappropriate regulatory and operational procedures resulting in

either excessive or no competition. The 1994 policy change paved the way for a more open and competitive market with several private players. The sector saw a significant increase in the numbers of domestic passengers. Growth in air travel was fuelled by India's rapid economic growth, rise in middle class incomes, increased business travel, low airfares offered by low cost carriers, the growth of the tourism industry in India, fleet expansion by airlines and service expansion by state owned carriers. This also signaled a shift from, the 'Maharaja syndrome' which perceived air travel as an elitist activity which only the rich and powerful could afford. Now aviation came to be viewed as an essential link for international travel and domestic connectivity. There was a gradual realization that aviation, by its very nature, is a critical part of the infrastructure of the country and has important ramifications as a stimulus for business activity and economic growth ((Deutsche Bank Research; Heymann; Just; Lowijk; Vath, 2007, p. 14) (Nilekani, 2008, p. 249).

• Airport Infrastructure

Beginning in the nineties, there was a phenomenal increase in the air traffic handled by both international and domestic airports. The growth in air traffic was due to the introduction of large capacity aircraft which promoted air travel for business, commerce and tourism. The phenomenal growth swamped the facilities available at the airports. Airport administrations such as the then IAAI and NAAI were gripped with feverish activity to modernize and expand the airports with new and large terminal buildings and hanger runways to cater to the growing traffic. In many cases the newly built airports and those which were modernized and renovated proved to be inadequate even before they were completed (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, pp. 3-4).

Airport infrastructure was linked to development of India's international competitiveness and her ability to attract foreign investment (Deutsche Bank Research; Heymann; Just; Lowijk; Vath, 2007, p. 15). But it was unable to keep pace with the rapid increase in passenger traffic. Most airports faced severe traffic congestion and frequent delays. Until 2000, there were five major international airports-Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi, Chennai

and Trivandrum. The Airport Infrastructure Policy of 1997 decided to set up Greenfield Airports in the country (141st report of the Department related Parliamentary Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture on 'Functioning of Private Airports & related issues', 2008) (141st report of the Department related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture on 'Modernization of Airports', 2008). The Greenfield Airport of Bangalore was announced in 2002, ahead of the AAI Amendment of 2003 which paved the way for the establishment of Greenfield Airports.

Placing civil aviation reform in the context of the economic reforms scenario, we may note that the liberalization and privatization program launched by the Congress party government under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1991 continued under the BJP- led National Democratic Alliance government with Prime Minister A.B.Vajpayee. This was billed as the second wave of reforms and had a number of motivations. Partly they were follow-up actions, which the first set of reforms had rendered inevitable; and these too were pushed by multilateral agencies (Taraqqi, 2001). However, the politics of stealth (Jenkins, 2007) which characterized the early reform effort was no longer necessary. The mood of the nation, as voiced by its political representatives, was changing.

A perusal of the Reports of the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Civil Aviation (141st report of the Department related Parliamentary Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture on 'Functioning of Private Airports & related issues', 2008) (141st report of the Department related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture on 'Modernization of Airports', 2008) (Lok Sabha, Parliament of India, 2008) displays certain recurrent concerns: the poor state of airports and airport infrastructure in the country, the inability of the Airports Authority of India to utilize budgetary funds, and an acquiescent acceptance of the private sector route for the promotion of the Greenfield airports in Bangalore and Hyderabad. This excerpt from the 90th Report is indicative of the prevalent mood: "Airports are the gateways to a nation. However, in our country, the state of airports, both domestic and international, leaves much to be desired. The Department-related

Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture discussed the state of airports in the country and was of opinion that the situation at the airports in the country was a cause of concern. Air travel has registered tremendous growth due to various factors such as higher incomes, more corporate activity, low cost airlines, cheaper fares and absence of adequate rail and road transport infrastructure. At a time when the civil aviation sector was taking wings in the country, the airport infrastructure in the country had come under tremendous stress. The infrastructure available at the airports and the amenities inside the airports are grossly inadequate and are in urgent need of replacement or modernization" (Rajya Sabha, Parliament of India, 2005, p. 3). It was in this climate of conceding the inevitability of reform and the inclusion of infrastructure, partially aviation infrastructure, as part of that reform that the Bangalore Airport was conceived and executed.

5. The Project : BIAL

5.1 The BIAL Story

If there was ever with a project with a history, it is the Bangalore International Airport.

The idea of a new airport for Bangalore was mooted in 1989 by Dr.S.R. Valluri, former Director of the state owned National Aeronautical Laboratories, to meet the growing aviation needs of the city. The project was initially conceived on a Build-Own-Operate model, and a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Tata group, one of India's largest industrial conglomerates and the principal promoter of the project, and the State government. Continuous delays led to the Tata consortium walking out of the project in 1998. The long and arduous journey toward the new airport was once again kick-started by the then Prime Minister A.B.Vajpayee in January 2002 and taken up by a Siemens-led consortium. Construction work was completed in early 2008, and the official launching was on 23 May 2008. From 1989 to 2008, the project has seen many changes in elected governments at the Government of India and Government of Karnataka.

The story of bial is not over. The project still draws bouquets and brickbats, and litigations relating to the

project are pending, this maiden effort at a Greenfield airport for Bangalore is truly rich in its political economy and public policy implications. In the ancient Indian language of Tamil there is a proverb that says: "The elephant alive is worth a 1000 gold coins, an elephant dead is also worth a 1000 gold coins". So also, this project is a repository of lessons, both in its achievements and its mistakes. For a researcher and policy maker, it offers an endlessly fascinating study.

5.2 The Location Controversy

BIAL had attracted its fair share of controversy in the course of its history, but none to match the outburst of public criticism and outrage that followed its launching. Spearheaded by the users located in the South of Bangalore employed in the IT sector who found the distance to Devanahalli daunting, the 'Save HAL' campaign' found enough lacunae in the new airport to justify keeping the old airport open. The polity soon took notice, and the matter was raised in the Legislative Assembly of Karnataka by the MLA of the Congress Party D.K.Shivakumar. This culminated in the appointment of the Joint House Committee under the Chairmanship of Hemachandra Sagar, MLA vide Bulletin No.29 dated 18.9.2008 (Karnataka Legislative Assembly Debates:Official Report:Part 1, 2008) (Minor Publication Part 2, 2008) (General Publication: Minor Publication Part-2, 2008).

Even as bial was nearing completion, its location was one of the primary issues of controversy.

- One of the earliest assessments came from the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore: "Geography, however, may be an important factor overlooked so far, and as the deadline to switch airports draw near, there is increasing consternation among sections of the public that the new airport ... may be ill-suited to serve a portion of the existing demand" (CPP, IIMB, 2008).
- The issue snowballed as blogs and newspapers took it up: "I chose to look around, and chat up with the airport staff, and ask them their opinions. Their daily commute of about 80km was the biggest source of displeasure, despite the free transport provided by their employers" (Agarwal, 2008).

- "Road commuters will be the first to feel the heat. It doesn't make sense to travel for two hours to the airport to catch a 30-minute flight," says Federation of Karnataka Chambers of Commerce and Industry President R.C. Purohit (OneIndia News, Sunday, June 10, 2007).
- "It's killing. There's no other way to describe it. It took us nearly three hours through numerous congested traffic junctions and suffocating pollution to get from Electronic City to the upcoming international airport in Devanahalli, a distance of 68 km. It was only a little better, about two hours, for those of us who started from J P Nagar and Rajarajeshwari Nagar" (TNN, 2007).

Considering the intensity of public reaction to the location of the airport at Devanahalli, it becomes important to examine the rationale behind the location decision. In this paper we highlight two episodes of the BIAL saga. These two episodes are divided in time, but closely linked to each other. We first examine the process of decision making in 1989-92 that located the airport at Devanahalli. We then establish the forward linkage of this episode to the drama that unfolded when the airport was launched over fifteen years later in 2008. We connect these two disparate incidents and time and analyze then for the lessons they throw up for policy maker and decision taker.

5.3 The Genesis of the Bangalore Airport

The story of Bangalore International Airport (hereinafter BIA) began in the old Hindustan Aeronautics Laboratories (hereinafter HAL) airport, some forty kilometers away from the spot where BIA is now located in Devanahalli. After protracted negotiations, the Director General Civil Aviation obtained a small piece of land known as 'civil enclave' in the HAL Airport for building a civil airport terminal in the 1960s. This building, which cost about Rs.60 lakhs, was designed and built for handling peak hour traffic of 300 passengers, arrivals and departures combined. By 1991, peak-hour traffic increased to 1800 passengers.

Bangalore meanwhile metamorphosed into one of the fastest growing cities in Asia. Population grew

by 38% between 1961 and 1971 and 76 % between 1971 and 1981, standing at three million in 1981. The establishment of large public sector undertakings engaged in the manufacture of aircraft, electronics, heavy machine tools, earth moving equipment and telephones in the 1950s and 1960s followed by massive investment in the private sector in a range of industrial and engineering products spurred the city's growth. The central location of Bangalore in the South, its temperate and salubrious climate, adequate availability of power in the 1960s and 1970s and its convenient links with other metropolitan cities and major state capitals contributed to the growth of industry, trade, commerce and tourism (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, pp. 4-5).

The air traffic through Bangalore also recorded spectacular growth. In the decade 1980-90, the rate of growth more than doubled. The mix of industries and high growth rate of industry made Bangalore into India's largest domestic air-cargo airport. Even without adequate facilities, Bangalore attracted upto five international dedicated cargo carriers weekly. The air cargo increased from 4986 tons in 1978 to 15394 tons in 1988 to 12664 tons (Indian Airlines) in 1991; postal mail from 896 tons in 1978 to 1170 tons in 1988 to 1190 tons (Indian Airlines) in 1991; The Terminal Building handled a total number of 4500 passengers daily and 30 tons of air cargo. Among the airports in India, Bangalore ranked fifth in terms of number of scheduled aircraft movements. Studies conducted by the AAI also indicated that Bangalore attracts a significant number of international passengers that passed through the Indian International Gateways of Bombay, Delhi and Madras (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, pp. 4-6) (TATA-Raytheon-Singapore Consortium, 6/1996, p. 2).

If the airport had been with the Civil Aviation department, it would have perhaps been possible to plan for an expansion and new terminals. However, as it was a Defence airport, there was no expansion, renovation or modernisation, leading to acute congestion. "People are jostling shoulder-to-shoulder and often the movement of baggage trollies (*sic*) causes leg injuries to passengers and visitors. Confusion is worse confounded by the large numbers of visitors who proceed to the viewing gallery on the mezzanine floor

criss-crossing their way through passengers, baggage trollies (*sic*) and visitors. In fact, during peak hours, the confusion and chaos must be seen to be believed" (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992) (Mattoo, 1998, p. 2).

Choked by the increase in civilian aircraft traffic HAL's very purpose of carrying out military flying operations has been hit. With the airport operating more than double its capacity, routine sorties and testing prototypes of transport, civilian and military aircraft designed and developed by defense establishments became difficult. Since a timeframe could not be set for military flying activities, HAL was put to inconvenience as every two minutes; a civilian aircraft was either taking off or landing at the airport during peak hours. The HAL airfield, out of which all civil and commercial aviation operations were conducted, was unable to meet the growth in demand due to its limited land area, and physical proximity to the city. Besides, HAL, a defense production unit, was an aircraft manufacturer and the prototype manufacturing developer for the Light Combat Aircraft and Advanced Light Helicopter. As these projects become more active, HAL needed its airfield for flight testing. This was likely to disrupt civil air operations.

To ease the situation, the HAL and AAI initiated measures to enhance the airport's capabilities. Eight new parking bays were built in front of the international/domestic apron and western end of the aerodrome as part of a Rs.50 crore improvement project, taking the total number of bays to 27. The ATC was improved with the installation of state-of-the-art communication equipment, including Airport Surveillance Radar, Monopulse Secondary Surveillance Radar and Radar Data Processing System. MD, HAL appealed to commercial flight operators not to add any more flights as it would only further worsen the situation (UNI , 2006).

In the 1980s, HAL came to be considered an embarrassment by a newly resurgent Bangalore. An airport is the first visible component of a city, and from this viewpoint, the HAL airport was a problem. It was not an international airport, and did not provide the picture of a hi-tech city that Bangalore wanted to project. While HAL earned some revenue from civil

aviation activity (about 200 crore when new airport took over in 2008), it was unable to leverage the full potential of non-aeronautical revenue that airports largely rely on, as it lacked frills such as duty-free shops and malls that attract an international traveller. The airport was a constraint on private airlines that grew with liberalization of the aviation sector, and there were complaints that Indian Airlines, the state carrier, was allowed landing while private carriers were kept hovering in the sky. All sides suffered, and it was not a happy situation for anyone concerned. (Interview with Scientist, NAL) (Interview with former Wing Commander, HAL).

The idea of building a new airport to serve Bangalore thus had its roots in the increased demand for air travel to Bangalore and the restrictions that HAL placed on civil traffic out of its airfield.

5.4 A New Airport for Bangalore

The idea of a new airport for Bangalore was first mooted by Dr.S.R.Valluri, former Director of National Aerospace Laboratories, Bangalore, to meet the growing aviation needs of the city. He took up a study of an Airport Terminal Design for Bangalore Airport on behalf of NAL in early 1989, which was welcomed by the Ministry of Civil Aviation and NAA. In his memoirs "Events in Life", he recalls the historic moment that launched the BIAL saga: "Improving the air travel facilities in Bangalore was a long-felt need. Once, in the late '80s, Dr R Narasimha, my successor as the Director of NAL, and I were returning from Thiruvananthapuram after attending a meeting in ISRO. We noted how crowded the airport was and how badly it was designed. We noted that more often than not, Indian airports were obsolete even before they were opened for operations. There was no forward planning in anticipation of future requirements. I proposed to Narasimha that we should do something about it, and that I would be glad if NAL were to formally obtain the approval of the Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation to study the issue, and that I would be glad to take on the responsibility of studying the problem. The then Secretary, Mr. Ganesan, readily agreed" (Valluri, 2006) (Interview). The study titled "A Case Study of an Airport Terminal Design for Bangalore Airport" was completed in November 1989

and unequivocally stated that Bangalore would require a new airport by year 2020. This study was submitted to the Government of India (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, p. 7) (Mattoo, 1998, p. 2) (Sharma et al, 2008, p. 3)..

The first articulation of the aspiration that the new airport should be an international airport also came in the early 1990s. Concurrently with the submission of the Valluri report, S.Ramanathan a retired IAS officer, then Chairman of the Tourism Committee the Federation of Karnataka Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FKCCI) and former Chairman of the International Airport Authority, wrote to the Government of Karnataka and the then Union Civil Aviation Secretary A.V. Ganesan requesting immediate action for development of the Bangalore airport in two phases: a short-term phase modifications and alterations to cater to the growth till 1995 and the selection of a new site for a new airport to cater to long-term growth. Formal representations were sent to the Secretary from FKCCI, Travel Agents Association of India, Karnataka Hotel and Restaurants Federation and Confederation of Engineering Industry (Southern Region). Responding to the FKCCI's invitation, Ganesan visited Bangalore in 1990 and held discussions with Karnataka Government officials, the HAL Chairman and FKCCI and Industry Associations. Following Ganesan's discussions, it became evident that Bangalore needed a new civil airport considering its importance and the great potential for growth of both domestic and international airtraffic and its development as a regional sub-base in the South (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, p. 10) (Mattoo, 1998) (Government of Karnataka, 7/12/1998).

It was at this juncture that the State government's role became important. The Government of Karnataka indicated that they desired to start international operations from Bangalore and approached the Union government for appropriate permissions. The Union Secretary called on the Chief Minister and Chief Secretary and was readily assured of 'fullest cooperation and support' (D.O.No. AV.20014/2/90-VB from A.V.Ganesan, Secretary,Civil Aviation, Govt. of India to Shri.Prabhakar Rao , Chief Secretary, Govt. of Karnataka, 1991).The Chief Minister S.Bangarappa stated in his Budget Speech 1992-93 as follows: "The

need for an International Airport at Bangalore to promote Industry, Trade and Commerce and also Tourism has been felt for a long time. The Government of India has constituted a committee to identify a suitable place for an International Airport. I appeal to the Government of India to take a decision in this regard very early and commence the construction of the project in the year 1992-93 itself and I assure through this house that the State Government will provide all necessary assistance and support for this venture” (1992-93, p. 77).

6. The Location Decision

6.1 The Valluri Report

The Valluri report of 1989, based on a study of air traffic growth in Bangalore and the plans of several international airports, recommended four alternatives to build a new domestic airport of adequate size with scope for future expansion and layout of access roads to and from the city.

- Shift the location and build a new airport.
- Expand/update the present terminal and simultaneously the apron on the air side.
- Build a new terminal on the other side of the runway.
- Renovate the present terminal extensively (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992) (Mattoo, 1998) (Valluri, 2006).

The National Airports Authority (NAA) did not favour construction of a new airport due to paucity of funds. The second alternative was also rejected as the land and airport belonged to the HAL. The third alternative was found infeasible as the land on the other side of the runway was a low-lying area prone to flooding and part of the land would have to be reclaimed by land filling. Hence, the NAA considered the fourth alternative of renovating and expanding the existing terminal building. It also initiated a proposal to acquire land adjacent to the airport in a phased manner. However, the required area of land sought was not available and only a small portion of 8 acres and 30 guntas was available. A large area of land had previously been vacant and available on the western boundary of the HAL airport and along the main airport road. If the land had been acquired 10-15 years earlier, it might have been possible to build a new terminal building with associated facilities. But

as this did not happen, housing colonies, commercial buildings and a 100 acre golf course sprung up in the area adjacent to the airport. All this highlighted the need for perspective planning for airport construction (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, p. 9) (Mattoo, 1998, pp. 2-3).

The State Government made a counterproposal offering land between Bangalore-Varthur-Sarjapur on the east of Bangalore Airport and Bellandur tank upto Varthur village. A note placed before the Karnataka Cabinet in 1996 states: “On examination of this proposal it was found that there were a number of villages in the area and built up houses. Besides the land was not contiguous with the airport boundaries. Hence this site was not considered suitable to a new terminal building. Prior to the constitution of the Site Selection Committee GOI had examined the possibilities of acquiring additional lands near the existing HAL airport for its expansion. However, having regard to the constraints of suitable lands being available contiguous to the existing airport and also the apprehensions of HAL that increased level of Civil Aviation operations through HAL airport was likely to pose problems for testing their own fighter aircraft and other types of planes, HAL was anxious that the GOI and the NAL should examine the possibility of selecting a new site for a civil airport” (Commerce and Industries department, 25/10/1996).

6.2 Revisiting the HAL Option

It was in these circumstances that A.V.Ganeshan held his consultative meeting in 1990. A fact that had hitherto been known only informally was confirmed during the Secretary’s meeting with Chairman, HAL. HAL had been suggesting that increased civil operations at the HAL airport may pose problems for testing of fighter aircraft. HAL therefore was anxious that the Govt. of India and the NAA examine the possibility of selecting a new site for a civil airport. The Ministry of Defence also suggested shifting of civil aviation activity (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, p. 13) (Mattoo, 1998, p. 3) (Government of Karnataka, 7/12/1998).

Another report emphasized that the “Government of Karnataka is extremely keen that a site for the new airport should be selected early”. It appears from Dr. Valluri’s account that HAL later changed its stance, and stated that civil operations need not be shifted,

but this revised view failed to prevail in the climate of opinion that had already grown in favour of a new airport. "The Chairman of HAL retired and another one took over. The new Chairman took the view that civil operations need not be shifted. At that time, HAL was apparently earning about Rs 15 crores (Rs150 million) per year as landing fees, certainly not a small sum. Incidentally, it was also found that the HAL airport would be able to handle the traffic for the next 25 years or so. But it became a matter of prestige to have a separate international airport, and the politicians had their way. But it was too late. The decision to shift the operations had been made" (Valluri, 2006).

The media took up the issue, and complaints on the HAL airports poor infrastructure were daily fodder for the press: "Chaos reigns supreme at Bangalore Airport" screamed one headline. With a half hour wait for security clearance, chaotic departure and arrival terminals, inadequate seating for passengers hit by delayed flights... Hal was an "Airport bursting at the seams" "a picture of chaos" (Kappan, Airport bursting at the seams, 2004) (Kappan, Chaos reigns supreme at Bangalore Airport, 2006).



CONFUSION: An unusual crowd was witnessed outside the departure lounge of the Bangalore airport on Sunday. Photo: K. Murali Kumar. Source: (Kappan, Chaos reigns supreme at Bangalore airport, 2006).

Thus, over 1989-91, we can trace a growing congruence of opinion regarding the construction of a new international airport for Bangalore. A proposal that had been initiated by a few like-minded persons in industry and NAL began to take on an air of urgency and inevitability. "It may be mentioned here that the construction of a new airport of international standard in Bangalore has been a long felt need of not only the Government but also the industry, trade and the general public. Notwithstanding the fact that HAL airport is being upgraded to some extent to meet the growing needs of civil aviation traffic till such time a new airport is constructed , it is need less to mention that HAL airport will not be in a position to meet the projected growth of civil aviation traffic on a long-term basis not only due to the needs of HAL airport for defence, testing and training purposes but also due to the fact that further expansion of HAL airport would be constrained due to non-availability of adequate contiguous lands for construction of a second runway (Commerce and Industries department, 25/10/1996, p. 7).

6.3 The Ramanathan Committee

Based on a detailed report by Ganesan, the Civil Aviation Ministry set up a committee in March 1991 under the chairmanship of S. Ramanathan, former Secretary to Government of India and Chairman of International Airport Authority of India "to examine alternative sites for construction of a modern and futuristic civil airport of international standards of international standards and make suitable recommendations"¹. The committee, which comprised technical members from NAL, HAL, IAF IAAI, DGCA and Indian Airlines; State government Secretaries from PWD and Revenue Departments, and industry representatives from CIE (Southern Region), FKCCI, Travel Agents Association of India and Air Cargo

1. *The Committee for Recommending a Site for a New Airport at Bangalore. Popularly known as Ramanathan Committee. Set up by Order No: AV.200014/2/90-VB Ministry of Civil Aviation Government of India, New Delhi dated 14.03.1991 (Ministry of Civil Aviation, Govt. of India, 1991). Members: S.Ramanathan, IAS Retd.(Chair) D. Valluri; Representatives of HAL; IAF; IA; AI; DGCA; IOC; Member Engineering IAAI; Secretaries to Govt of Karnataka in Revenue & PWD; Representatives of CIE, Southern Region, Bangalore; FKCCI; Travel Agents Association of India; Air Cargo Association of India; Member (Planning & Engineering), NAA (Member Secretary). Core group: Tenure:14/3/1991 to 26/6/1992. Six meetings (5:Bangalore; 1:New Delhi). 1 Special Core Group Meeting.*

Association of India, submitted its report to the Centre in June 1992. (Setting up of a Committee for examining alternative sites near Bangalore for the construction of a civilian airport of international standards, 1991) (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992) (Mattoo, 1998, p. 3) (Government of Karnataka, 7/12/1998) (Interview, Former Member Site Selection Committee) (Interview, Former Chairman Site selection Committee).

The Ramanathan Committee which was initially given a brief of six months, submitted its report in June 1992. In a period of fifteen months it conducted a detailed examination including spot inspection, basing its examination on technical considerations of airspace management, practical considerations of land availability, power, water and suitability of terrain. The contents of the report become especially important in view of latter day allegations in the media that the location decision was made casually and without much thought (D.O.letter from S.Ramanathan, IAS (Retd), Chairman, Committee for recommending a new site for Bangalore Airport to S.Kanungo, Secretary, Civil Aviation, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Govt.of India, 26/06/1992) (Ministry of Civil Aviation, Govt. of India, 1991) (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992) (Government of Karnataka, 7/12/1998).

6.4 Process of Site Selection

In the period between March 1991 to June 1992, the Committee held five sittings in Bangalore on 19th/20th April 1991, 19th December 1991, 19th February 1992, 15th June 1992. In addition, a meeting was convened on 4th July 1991 presided over by Dr.Valluri, in the absence of the Chairman who was abroad, and attended by members stationed in Delhi. A meeting of the Special Core Group was held on 24th March 1992 in Bangalore to study issues of Integrated Airspace Management (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, p. 33) (Minutes of the Meeting of Special Core Group on evolving an Integrated Air Space Management and Report, 1992) (Valluri, 2006).

A detailed narrative in the report details the process followed by the Committee. Its first step was to lay out

the norms for site selection. Broadly, the criteria invoked during deliberations included: the capacity to meet both domestic and international traffic, safety requirements, operation of B-747; constraints of airspace management due to the existence of three airports² in Bangalore, a runway length of 14500 ft suitable for Airbus -300 and occasional landing of B-747; adequate provision of land area for construction of a parallel runway, taxi-tracks and additional passenger terminals, adequate space for all infrastructures such as 4 to 6 lane Express Highways, rapid mass transportation systems for access to airports, residential colony for workforce, terminals for international and domestic cargo, provision of water supply for airport and colony, location of oil terminal, a site dimension capable of accommodating a strip 6kmx2.5km, site should meet traffic growth for next thirty years. A formal document of technical parameters was prepared by NAA and provided to the State Government (National Airports Authority, Undated).

The site selection exercise placed the State government centre-stage. The report indicates that it took considerable time for the State government to identify suitable sites, and it was only after the Committee gave the broad guidelines regarding the criteria to be followed for identifying sites were they able to get on to the work. In consultation with the Deputy Commissioners of the districts surrounding the Bangalore metropolitan area, the State government through its Revenue Commissioner suggested various sites in Bangalore Rural district. It also appears that all the sites were not suggested all at once, but at different points in time (Vijayapura and Devanahalli first; Malur, Yelahanka and Kengeri later), which too might have involved some revisiting of issues (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, p. 30) (D.O.letter from S.Ramanathan,IAS (Retd) ,Chairman, Committee for recommending a new site for Bangalore Airport to S.Kanungo, Secretary, Civil Aviation, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Govt.of India ,26/06/1992) (Interview with former Assistant Commissioner, Devanahalli during the selection process).

Different site options in the North of Malur, Kengeri-I, Kengeri-II, Vijayapura, South of Devanahalli and

2. IAF Yelahanka, State government Airfield for Flying at Jakkur and HAL Aerodrome.

Yelahanka, and Kanminike Village, near Mysore Road, Bangalore South were proposed to the Committee, of which two-Vijayapura and Devanahalli- were shortlisted for inspection. While the Committee members conducted ground inspection of the proposed sites-“the entire team walked around these areas”, the HAL member Capt. Ashok conducted aerial survey (Resume of First Meeting). The Committee also formed a Core Group of officials of the NAA (Resume of Second meeting) to examine the sites in detail after receipt of data from the State Government. The Core Group met on 03.07.1991 and prepared a detailed comparative statement. In pursuance of a suggestion from Dr.Valluri (resume of Preparatory Meeting in Delhi, p.37), who was apprehensive of the distance of Devanahalli from Bangalore, the Core Group of Director (Planning), Director (Operations) and Assistant Director (Planning), NAA visited Air headquarters on 25.10.1991 and examined the feasibility of Yelahanka aerodrome (Core Group of Site Selection Committee, 25.10.1991) (Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore Sub-division, Bangalore, 1991) (Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, 1991) (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, pp. 35, 37, 45-52).

In its early meetings, the Committee apparently once again revisited the expansion of HAL airport as an option. The non-technical members made out a case for retaining and expanding the HAL airport with additional buildings and parking. At that time, the advice of the Chief Test Pilot of was emphatic. The existing airport was being used by HAL primarily for test flying. HAL was also the only Air Force Test Centre of the Air Force at the time. There were also corporate planes, which were on unscheduled adhoc flying. Test flying included both prototype and production testing, of multiple types of aircraft including Fighters, Bombers, Trainer Aircraft and Helicopters. Test flying is an intense and continuous activity, involving high levels of skill and risk of failure and mishaps. In this scenario, with the possibility of engine failure, fire, low start up fuel, flight manoeuvres, and sudden emergency landings, a dedicated test-flying airfield was essential, always available to the test pilot was essential. In conditions of low-level civilian flying, some interface of test flying with airline flying could still be possible with slot allocation. But mixing

intensive civilian operations with intensive test flying operations was asking for trouble, with implications for safety. This tipped the balance in favour of a new airport HAL (Interview with former Chief Test Pilot, HAL) (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992).

Once the decision for a new location was firmed up, the question was where to locate it. The Committee wanted an airport as close as possible from the city but separate from it, to avoid obvious problems like noise, pollution, traffic and safety. The Committee was constrained by the options provided by the state government; and the revenue authorities were in turn constrained by the availability of contiguous land that met the stringent terrain and operational requirements that an airport inherently entailed. Neither the state government nor the Committee had the freedom to pick and choose any piece of land anywhere surrounding Bangalore.

The HAL airport was oriented in an East-West based on wind direction. Air traffic management and safety precautions required that any new airport had to be located to the South or North. This eliminated sites such as the one on Mysore road. Looking South, Bangalore was not only overcrowded, but a sufficient distance from HAL would take the airport to Hosur. Hence, the choice was narrowed to sites to the North of Bangalore (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992) (Interview : former Director, NAL; Former Chief Test Pilot HAL, both members in Site Selection Committee, Former Chairman, Site Selection Committee).

6.5 The Evaluation Exercise

The final evaluation therefore relied on the following:

- The deliberations of the Committee
- The Spot Inspection of Committee members
- The Comparative Statement of Sites by the Core Group (Comparative Statement of Sites Inspected by Selection Committee, 1991)
- Aerial survey by Captain Ashoka
- The Core Group Spot inspection and Feasibility Report on Yelahanka Aerodrome Site (Core Group of Site Selection Committee, 25.10.1991)

- NAA's Proforma for selection of site (National Airports Authority, Undated)
- The details furnished by the State Government (Preliminary Report on Aerodrome Site: DEVANAHALLI) (Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore Sub-division, Bangalore, 1991) (Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, 1991) (Tahsildar, Sidlaghatta Taluka, 1991) (Tahsildar, Sidlaghatta Taluk, Sidlaghatta, 1991)
- The Report on Cargo handled at Bangalore Air Cargo Complex (Mysore Sales International Limited)
- Perspective Plan prepared by Indian Airlines (Indian Airlines, 1991).

When the choice narrowed down to Devanahalli, the Committee also commissioned the Report of Integrated Airspace Management by a Special Core Group to study the specific problems arising out of the proximity of Defence Airports (Minutes of the Meeting of Special Core Group on evolving an Integrated Air Space Management and Report, 1992) (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992).

The evaluation of sites was based following parameters: physical conditions, type of terrain, surrounding obstructions; availability of utilities such as power and water, accessibility to ground transport, availability of land for future expansion, technical factors such as the presence of other airports in the vicinity.

North of Malur: This site was located 27 miles East, North east of the existing HAL Aerodrome. The terrain was mainly undulating. Adequate strip of land was not available. This site was not operationally suitable as adequate land was not available. The land was in close proximity to the final approach of Yelahanka, Jakkur and the HAL aerodromes. The final approach was affected by hillocks surrounding the site. The site was therefore not recommended by the Committee.

Kengeri-I : This site was located 15 km south-west of HAL Aerodrome on Bangalore-Mysore road. The terrain was undulating and mainly rocky. Adequate land not available. The site was not operationally suitable. Therefore it was not recommended.

Kengeri-II : This site was located 22 km South West of HAL Aerodrome. The terrain at the site was mainly undulating. It was also rocky, adequate land is not available for a modern airport of international standards. Since the runway was on an east-west direction, the land for laying such a runway in this area is not possible due to the highly undulating nature of the terrain, which would involve considerable expenditure on cutting and filling. Further, the site was not operationally suitable due to the close proximity to the final approach of the HAL aerodrome. The site is not recommended.

Vijayapura : This site was situated 55 km North, North-East of HAL aerodrome. It was located on an elevated platform at the Southern part of Sidlaghatta taluka in Kolar district. It is connected to National Highway at a distance of 22 km north and National highway -7 at a distance of 15 km east, which leads to Bangalore city. This site which had a dimension of 6 kms x 3 kms was a flat area with an altitude of 910 metres above sea level. The geographical extent of the above site works out to 3411 acres of which 1235 acres are Government land under the reserved forest category. The remaining extent of 2176 acres was private holdings. Adequate land was available. The surface soil was hard and compact laterite soil without any intrusions or outcrop. Though it was a reserved forest, there had been considerable illegal felling of trees and what remained in patches were trees of various kinds including Eucalyptus, Tamarind, Cashew and other shrubs (Interview with former Assistant Commissioner, Devanahalli). The overall gradient is gentle and a major portion is on a elevated platform. Except for one contour of 920 metres at the border of this strip, the entire area has a altitude of 900 metres. The area was almost flat land. The condition of the ground was good even after the rainfall as the land was on an elevated level. It has good drainage and there was no chance of water stagnation in the area. The hills in the vicinity did not pose any obstructions. The road links were good via Devanahalli and Hosakote. Adequate land was available for terminal buildings, runways, associated facilities for cargo and other engineering, maintenance bases. After examination, the Committee found that the site was operationally suitable except for firing practice carried out in the range by the Army. However, it was felt that

this may not pose a problem and it may be possible either to shift or impose suitable restrictions on the firing range in consultation with NAA for the safety of the aircraft. Having regard to these considerations, the committee initially found it to be suitable to be the site of an airport of international standards.

However, this initial assessment was not accepted by Dr.Valluri who chaired the preparatory meeting in New Delhi. He expressed his apprehension about the construction of the airport at a site 5 kilometers from Bangalore city. He expected that by the year 2000 itself, the load would be about 10000 passengers per day and the cost of fuel for ground transportation would amount to Rs.35 crores per year which a country like India can ill afford. He therefore suggested that the possibility of taking over Yelahanka from IAF after making a thorough study of the availability of land at the airfield may be explored by NAA in coordination with Air Headquarters. In his memoirs Dr.Valluri states: "The Karnataka government offered land about 75 km from the city centre. I could not visit the place. The other committee members approved it. Clearly, they did not do their homework or appreciate the problems air travellers would face if the airport were to be located so far away. The time for travel from city center to airport for travel to nearby cities like Chennai, would double; clearly not an acceptable solution" (Interview with former Director NAL & Member, Site Selection Committee) (Interview with former IAS officer & Chairman, Site Selection Committee (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992) (Valluri, 2006).

This perception was a farsighted one, considering the later criticism about Devanahalli, a good 20 km closer to the city than Vijayapura. Keeping in view the distance from Bangalore, accessibility by land, the commuting time needed for thousands of vehicles making round trips from the airport, Vijayapura which was located 55 kilometers from Bangalore City Centre was not suitable. Considering from these points of view the Committee was not in favour of selecting this site.

Yelahanka : With the rejection of Vijayapura, the Committee considered the Yelahanka airfield, which belonged to the Indian Air Force. This airfield was the main training base for Transport Wing of the Indian Air Force and initial training for pilots flying transport

planes was given here. The infrastructure consisted of a runway suitable for transport aircraft and helicopters of the Air Force and some basic supporting infrastructural facilities. In pursuance of the decision taken in the New Delhi meeting, the members of the core Group visited Air Headquarters, New Delhi on 28.12.1991 to examine the grid map/ land map of the Yelahanka aerodrome. In the absence of the grid map, the land map available with IAF was examined. The prima facie examination indicated that the existing runway at Yelahanka can be extended after diverting the National highway linking Bangalore to Bellary and acquisition of the surrounding land. Since the AHQ had no idea of the land area around the aerodrome, it was decided that a site inspection had to be carried out before coming to any conclusion. After obtaining necessary permission the core group comprising the Director (Planning), Chief Engineer, and Assistant Director (Planning) of NAA inspected the Yelahanka aerodrome on 18.12.1991. It was observed that the extension runway by 900 feet is only possible at the Western end due to running of meter and broad gauge railway lines. As regards extension to the Eastern side, it was observed that only land area upto a distance of 600 ft was available with IAF and beyond this NH & is running North-South. The extension is possible only if the NH 7 was considerably diverted. Beside the area around the airport was low lying which needs to be filled up for raising the level of the existing aerodrome. It was also observed that there is no possibility of having a parallel runway in future and an aerodrome with only one runway has to be accepted. Besides, the Core Group noted that some assets in terms of land area, hangars, runway, parking apron and residential quarters belonging to the IAF were costly and based on current market prices, the compensation to be paid to IAF would be considerable. The Core group further observed that in the event of taking over Yelahanka aerodrome for development of a civil airport of international standards, Jakkur airfield should also be taken over for future integration with the main airport. In that case the development of parallel runway would be possible, supported by rapid transport system for commutation between Yelahanka and Jakkur airfields (Core Group of Site Selection Committee, 25.10.1991) (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992).

However, this option also came to nought. As Dr.Valluri describes it , I met the then Chief Secretary of the Government of Karnataka and asked him whether the government would be willing to give alternative land and compensation, if the Air Force would be willing to give the Yelahanka Training Command Air Force Base to be developed as the international airport. He said that if the Air Force would agree, he would arrange for them to get as much land as they wanted, anywhere in Karnataka, and full compensation for the facilities they would be leaving behind. Rough estimates indicated that the government would have to pay about Rs 500 crores (Rs 5 billion) as compensation to the Air Force. It was clear to me that sooner or later, the Air Force would have to shift the operations of the Training Command from Yelahanka, as Bangalore by then had already started expanding rapidly in that direction. With the assurance from the Chief Secretary, I called for a meeting of the committee in Delhi to examine this alternative. The approval was unanimous, with the Air Force representatives stating that while they agreed in principle, they had no authority to speak on behalf of the Air Force. The Air Force said, "We always take and never give". So ended the efforts to develop Yelahanka Training Command AFB as an international airport. I then once again approached the Chief Secretary and briefed him about the development and sought an alternative location closer to the city, as the one offered was too far. Land near Devanahalli was offered as an alternate site. It is about 35 km from the city centre" (Valluri, 2006)(Interview with former Director, NAL & Member, Site Selection Committee).

South of Devanahalli : Thus, the options narrowed down to Devanahalli. This site was 15km North, North East from Yelahanka Air Force Airfield on Highway-7. It was 5 km South of Devanahalli, which was the taluka HQ, commencing in the revenue limits of Yarataganahalli village as its Western boundary near the National Highway and stretching East-West. The distance from the Vidhana Soudha, the State Secretariat building in Bangalore was 29 km. The site mainly consisted of dry hard soil. A small part of it was reserved forest and the rest private land. The land was flat, fairly level and requires minimum grading for construction of runway and other pavements. The soil

surface is hard and there is good drainage. However, the land was in a drought prone area and ground water sources were not good. The land was well connected by road and a narrow gauge railway line and near to Bangalore city. This land was found suitable for an airport of international standards. It had enough land for a terminal building, runways, associated facilities and for cargo, engineering and maintenance base. There was also room for expansion in view of the availability of land. The site was only 29 kms from the central line connected by the National Highway 7(Bangalore-Hyderabad highway) and also served by a narrow gauge rail line which almost ran parallel and adjacent to the National Highway at the point where the Western boundary of the proposed site ends. It was possible to provide the direct rail links to the Terminal building in the proposed site after discussions with the Ministry of Railways and the State Government. If this was done, the feeder services from the airport could be run connecting both the Bangalore Cantonment and the City Railway stations. This would eliminate to a great extent the need for commuting by cars and coaches to the airport, thus resulting in tremendous savings in fuel.

However, in spite of all these advantages, a major constraint in recommending this site which came to the notice of the Committee was the close proximity of both the HAL Airport as well as the Yelahanka Air force Airfield. Operationally, it was close to Yelahanka Air Force airfield from where transport aircraft of the IAF carried out a large number of training sorties. Besides both Yelahanka and HAL had their own traffic control. If an airport in very close proximity to Yelahanka and HAL had to be sited, it would be necessary to examine whether it was possible to have an integrated air space management for all the three airports including the proposed civil airport under the control of one agency equipped with the latest and modern navigational and landing aids.

Accordingly, the Chairman had formal talks with the AOC in C in Bangalore and the Vice Chief of Air Staff in Delhi to explore the feasibility of IAF accepting broadly the concept of an integrated airspace management. He also discussed this matter with the Executive Director of HAL. Fortunately, there was good understanding at

the top levels that considering the great advantages, which the site South of Devanahalli possessed, it should be possible to have an integrated airspace management. In pursuance of this understanding a Core Group consisting of the representatives of the training command of IAF at Yelahanka, the HAL aerodrome, DGCA, AHQ, Indian Airlines and NAA was constituted to examine the matter in depth and make suitable recommendations. This Core Group met in Bangalore on 24.3.1992. The Group examined the matter in great detail and the need for an integrated airspace under management under one agency was accepted with the pre-condition that the airport must be equipped with the latest air traffic management system. A preliminary model on air space management of the three aerodromes at Bangalore and also Jakkur aerodrome (used as a Flying Club) was prepared and adopted by all participants. The Committee mentioned that at the appropriate time when the detailed planning of the air space management is taken up, the air space requirements of HAL and IAF Yelahanka are kept in view. Therefore, in view of the suitability of the site South of Devanahalli from all angles including that of integrated air space management, the Committee recommends this site as the most suitable for the location of the new airport. "By that time, Mr Ramanathan returned, and we all went to see the place and concluded it would be a good alternative. Proximity to Yelahanka and the HAL

airport would pose some air traffic control problems, but the committee felt that a common air traffic control for the three airports should be able to handle the problems" (Minutes of the Meeting of Special Core Group on evolving an Integrated Air Space Management and Report, 1992) (Core Group, 1991) (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992, pp. 30-2) (Valluri, 2006)(Interviews with Chairman & Members, Site Selection Committee & former Assistant Commissioner, Devanahalli).

The proposed site for Bangalore International Airport (BIA) was finally located at Devanahalli, situated 30 km due North from the centre of Bangalore city Vidhana Soudha and 4 km south of Devanahalli village. The site area (4276.3 acres notified) fell outside the municipal limits of Bangalore city. The Southern portion of the site 9 about 416.8 acres falls in Bangalore North Taluka, the balance is within Devanahalli taluka (S.Ramanathan, 6/1992) (TATA-Raytheon-Singapore Consortium, 6/1996, p. 14).

7. The HAL Airport: to close or not to close?

7.1 The Rumble Begins

As the construction progressed and the AOD was approaching, opinions came to be expressed through the media, seminars and debates that the HAL airport should not be closed for commercial operations. The



Area in vicinity of BIAL, Devanahalli. Photographed by author, 19.01.2010.

This is the story of the Location Decision, the selection and location of the new Bangalore Airport in Devanahalli. As we saw, this process took place between 1989-92, and was approved by the Government of India in 1994. Now let us fast forward to 2008, the new airport construction is almost complete, and the city and the airport readies for the inauguration after a twenty year wait.

Union Civil Aviation Ministry gazetted a notification on 16.5.2008 stating that the HAL Airport would be closed down on 22.5.2008 midnight simultaneously with the opening of the new international airport at Devanahalli (Staff Reporter, Thursday, May 22, 2008). This became the trigger for the "Save HAL" campaign.

The grounds the demand for continuance of the HAL airport were: poor connectivity to the new airport; insufficient capacity to cater to current and future demand; distance from the city; the recent renovation of the HAL airport would become wasteful and infructuous expenditure if it is closed, and so on. For the Government of India and Karnataka it posed a dilemma of drawing a fine balance between a number of different considerations, namely (a) contractual obligations to an important infrastructure project (b) the mobility needs of a section of the user population and (c) the need to maintain the economic vitality that made Bangalore an attractive choice in the new economy (CPP, IIMB, 2008). As the demand grew increasingly strident, a medley of different interest groups - politicians, corporate heads, parliamentarians, citizens' groups, and media - threw themselves in to the campaign in a telling demonstration of the bandwagon effect. Thus began the interplay of different actors with disparate backgrounds that led to the drama that began shortly before the Airport Opening Date and is being played out even today. In this section we look in greater detail at the actors and the arguments that coalesced into the demand for keeping HAL open as a second airport.

7.2 The Actors. . .

• Unions and Employees Associations

Substantial resistance came from the employees union of the Airports Authority of India. What began as a 'non-cooperation' drive became an indefinite nationwide strike of an estimated 18000 employees working at 135 airports across the country. Airport operations across the country came to a halt after talks between the Airport Authority Employees Joint Forum and Secretary, Civil Aviation failed and their demand to continue operations of the existing Bangalore and Hyderabad airports was rejected. Though the employees' union protested privatization

of airports in general, it also focused specifically on the development of new airports at Hyderabad and Bangalore by private players, which would eventually result in the closure of existing ones run by AAI. One of the Union representatives stated; "Our agitation is also in protest over the ongoing privatization of airports by the AAI" (India Today, 2008). Though flight operations remained largely unaffected, AAI employees from fire-fighting, housekeeping, engineering and ground safety departments left their duties and shouted slogans pressing for implementation of their demands. Used coffee and tea cups, empty water bottles and waste paper could be seen littering airports and passengers complained of dirty toilets. Waste material remained uncleared at the international arrival terminal and domestic arrival and departure terminals with the maintenance workers participating in the agitation.

Taking a tough stand, the Union government invoked ESMA against AAI employees at Delhi airport and positioned 479 Air Force personnel at 21 airports across the country to deal with contingencies. The then Joint Secretary, Civil Aviation said: "Delhi government has invoked Essential Services Maintenance Act at the Indira Gandhi International airport here. It is already in operation. I hope the unions know about the large number of directives issued by Delhi High Court. I hope the unions remember these. We hope we will be able to control the situation and expect normal air services tomorrow. Government is also contemplating invoking a 1984 law which empowers officers of the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security to arrest those who sabotage functioning of fire services, power and water supply and endanger safety and security of the airport. This law can be imposed" (Interview with former Joint Secretary, Civil Aviation).

While talking tough, Government also reached out to the agitating employees, assuring them that the old airports in Hyderabad and Bangalore would be used for general aviation and they have "nothing to worry about their future". Civil Aviation Minister Praful Patel assured that "The existing airports are not being closed down. They will be used for general aviation apart from defence purposes and national emergencies. Keeping in mind the interests of all sections, we will

try to find a way out of the legal problems in the future, speak to the operators of the Greenfield airports” Urging the employees to see reason and withdraw their agitation in the interest of the nation and the travelling public, the Civil Aviation Minister said new airports have to be constructed in national interest. The employees’ representatives, accompanied by CPI (M) and CITU leaders M K Pandhe, Tapan Sen and Dipankar Mukherjee, had an almost hour-long meeting with Civil Aviation Minister Praful Patel. After Patel’s assurances that modernization of 35 non-metro airports would be undertaken with “full involvement” of the AAI and its employees the Forum leaders met separately and decided to withdraw their agitation. However, their effort continued through the legal route.

• Corporates

If the unions were the hard muscle, the corporate sector was the suave voice of the protest. Information Technology companies in the city represented by NASSCOM President Kiran Karnik, Infosys Vice President Mohan Das Pai, Chief Executive Officer Gopalkrishna, and Wipro CEO Vishwanathan, appealed to the Karnataka Chief Minister H D Kumaraswamy to retain the HAL Airport even after the opening of the Devanahalli International Airport. In a memorandum to the Chief Minister during a breakfast meeting, they felt that retaining the present airport would be appropriate instead of closing down of commercial operations. The Federation of Karnataka Chambers of Commerce and Industry President R C Purohit was quoted as saying the “Road commuters will be the first to feel the heat. It doesn't make sense to travel for two hours to the airport to catch a 30-minute flight” and that some flights should be retained at the HAL airport, at least till a rail link or a dedicated road is established between the City and Devanahalli (OneIndia News, Sunday, June 10, 2007) (UNI, 2007).

Unconfirmed reports also circulated that several of the top IT heads contacted the CEO, Siemens in Germany, through the good offices of CEO, BOSCH in a last ditch effort to persuade Siemens to agree to a contractual charge; an effort that did not succeed. (Interview with Infrastructure expert, FKCCI).

• Private Airlines

The media reported that leading private airline operators called upon the state and central governments to re-examine the decision to close the HAL Airport to commercial traffic once the Devanahalli airport became functional. Their contention was that not only many global cities have more than one airport; certain flights are best operated out of a facility closer to the city. Capt.Gopinath, Managing Director, Air Deccan, apparently representing the private airlines’, confirmed that he was in talks with the government. “Bangalore is a global city, and all global cities have multiple airports. London has five. I met the Chief Secretary a few days ago, and he indicated he's open to the idea”. Criticizing the government’s decision to close HAL airport, he said the projection in air traffic made during the time the contract was signed did not hold water, as the air traffic had exceeded the projection; and it was a mistake to give a monopoly to BIAL. According to the clauses of the contract signed by the Government, no airport is allowed to come up within 150 kms radius, with the exception of airports at Mysore and Hassan which he dubbed anti-development. Arguing that multiple airports lead to competition among airports and, therefore, better services to customers he also said that for customers flying short regional routes, huge airports like Devanahalli would pose inconvenience on account of the time taken to get to it, the long queues, and stricter security. “ It'll impede regional connectivity, and so we need another airport that is closer to the city and which will have lower airport charges” The suggestion was that HAL Airport could initially be one for regional flights, and later grow to accommodate more varied flights. Citing examples of London which had five airports and other European countries, he questioned the logic behind not allowing two airports to function in a city. “We should not lose one infrastructure to another”.

This opinion was echoed by Warwick Brady, Chief Operating Officer, Air Deccan, who was quoted as saying that the airline is for retaining the existing HAL airport for short-haul flights. “With the skyrocketing demand for air travel, the Devanahalli airport operators will more than achieve the projected growth in passenger

traffic by 2010. So there is no reason for the HAL airport to be considered a competition,"

In a turnaround from HAL's earlier position that civilian traffic hampered its defence of test flight functions, C.G Krishnadas Nair, a former Chairman, HAL claimed: "HAL had never wanted to close its airport. But the then government decided to go by the demand of the consortium. BIAL was worried that HAL would compete with it and take away its business". HAL officials, however, maintained that the airport was not top priority in the company's scheme and that it's pursuing its own plans, including Maintenance, Repair and Overhauling (MRO) facilities with global players(Interviews: Infrastructure Expert, FKCCI; former Chairman HAL) .

• **Parliamentary and Legislative Committees**

At this juncture the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism & Culture was requested to submit a report on Privatization and Modernization of Airport of India. The Committee visited Bangalore International Airport on 15.9.2008, and conducted wide ranging discussion with various stakeholders including representatives of Airport Authority Employees Union. Subsequently it submitted its 142nd report to the parliament titled "Functioning of Private Airports and Related Issues" which discussed exhaustively the demand for keeping the HAL Airport open. The report highlighted several issue:

The closure of the HAL Airport was not mentioned in the tender for Bangalore Greenfield Airport and making an offer of closure of HAL Airport, after Notice Inviting Tender appears to be a clear violation of the due process; granting permission start a Greenfield airport within a radius 150 K.M of the existing HAL Airport, without a passenger sharing formula prima-facie seems to be in violation of the Govt. policy on Airport infrastructure; the continuance of the Bangalore HAL Airport with the consent of the management of BIAL and Govt. of India shows that if the Govt. wants they can operationalize the old airport with notwithstanding the concession agreement; Sec.5A of Aircraft at 1934 under which HAL airport was notified to be closed talks of danger to the aircraft / Country which reason

is totally irrelevant for the instant case; the NOC for setting of Bangalore Greenfield Airport by the Ministry of Defence made it amply clear that the operations at HAL Airport will continue even after BIAL becomes functional and the choice of Airport to be utilize should be left to the operators / commuters / general public; There are examples of more than one Airport coexisting in cities to cater to various types of passengers requirements. For all the above reasons the Committee recommended that the HAL Airport should be made functional: "The Committee notes some merit made by the representatives AAEU. It also feels that the closure of the Bangalore and Hyderabad appears to have been in haste. It is no doubt (sic) deprives the AAI the good amount of revenue that it needs to cross subsidized airport in remote areas. The Committee of the considered view the HAL Airport at Bangalore, Begumpet Airport at Hyderabad may be made operational for Domestic Civil Aviation (141st report of the Department related Parliamentary Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture on 'Functioning of Private Airports & related issues', 2008).

At the level of the state government also, there was legislative intervention, though this came after the launch of the airport rather than before. The spate of public complaints that accompanied the launching made the polity sit up and take notice. The matter was taken up for discussion in the Karnataka Legislative Assembly and there was strong criticism from Legislative members particularly from the Congress party. The newly elected BJP Government appointed the "Joint House Committee to Examine the Construction and Issues to Bangalore International Airport" on 18.09.2008. The Committee met on several occasions and interacted with officers and officials of the Government, BIAL, industry representatives and the general public. The Joint House Committee report tabled on 21.12.2009 devotes a complete section to the closure of HAL airport. (Joint House Committee, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, Thirteenth Assembly, 2009).

The Committee report reiterated several of the issues that had been reported in the media and other public fora. It pointed that the policy of the Centre in signing the CA with BIAL to close down the HAL airport is

inconsistent with its own policy in other sectors; the airport infrastructure policy in 1997 stated that no Greenfield airport would normally be allowed within an aerial distance of 150 km of an existing/functional airport; thus BIAL has been established in violation of its own policy by the Centre. Further, the notice inviting tender for establishing a new Greenfield airport in Bangalore did not contain any clause about closure of HAL airport, which is capable of handling an average of 360 movements (departures / arrivals) per day with a peak hour capacity of 30 movements (departures/ arrivals) per hour. Low-cost carriers and their users will be the hardest hit as the 'throughput charge', and the user development fee would exceed the price of air tickets on short-haul sectors. The closure of HAL airport negated the healthy competition and created private monopoly. Concluding that the closure of existing HAL airport caused loss to users, airlines, staff and the numerous people engaged in transport, catering and other services at the busy metropolitan airport, the JHC recommended that the existing airport be kept open (Joint House Committee, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, Thirteenth Assembly, 2009).

• Political Voices

Political leaders, across party lines, joined the chorus. A number of political leaders and parliamentarians were cited in the press as supporting the move to keep HAL airport open:

- ☛ Sitaram Yechury of CPM, who headed the Parliamentary Standing Committee looking into the issue, reportedly wrote to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh demanding that the existing HAL airport be kept open for small aircraft operations, as was the case in major cities like Dallas, Houston and Newark. "Given the fact that in both Hyderabad and Bangalore, capacity has saturated there is no reason for the Centre to close existing airports. The government should renegotiate the deal with promoters of new airports. As the PIL on the closure of Hyderabad airport is coming up on April 4, the government should not rush to close this airport by March 15."
- ☛ Former Chief Minister of Karnataka M Veerappa Moily: "The international airport was conceived

during my tenure as CM and we had also planned the connectivity road to it. Unfortunately, successive governments under Deve Gowda cold-shouldered these plans. The Centre should negotiate with the promoters of the project for the sake of the people and impress upon them that at least for short haul flights, HAL airport requires to be kept open."

- ☛ Former Chief Minister of Karnataka N Dharam Singh: "An international airport for international flights is fine. But for short distance flights, one cannot be travelling three hours to catch a 40 minute duration flight. My party will represent to the Centre highlighting the difficulties."
- ☛ D V Sadananda Gowda, MP and state BJP president: "There's no doubt that Bangalore needs an airport of international standard. The government should allow HAL airport to function for domestic sectors until a faster connectivity to International airport at Devanahalli is in place."
- ☛ BJP MP from Bangalore North (which includes Devanahalli), H T Sangliana: "HAL airport should be utilized for operating domestic flights and the government should initiate a dialogue with the BIAL on this. The Devanahalli airport can be utilized for international flights. Though costs more, an international passenger can afford it."
- ☛ The CPM central committee: "The closure of the existing Hyderabad and Bangalore airports will deal a mortal blow to the fortunes of the Airports Authority of India converting it into a loss-making enterprise" (Compiled from (TNN, 2008)).

• Civil Society

Ramesh Ramanathan, of Janaagraha, largely representing the voice of the residents of Bangalore South, wrote in a daily as follows: "So, a few weeks in advance, here's a greeting to Bangalore's air travelers: Welcome to the most under designed, under connected, woeful piece of infrastructure that is the face of new India to the world. Maybe we can harness a new source of renewable energy in India: "angry citizen energy". It's available in plenty, and being replenished every day by our governments." The first legal challenge to the

GOI notification in the High Court of Karnataka also came from a Bangalore resident Mr. Krishna Bhat on the grounds that the provisions invoked by the Civil Aviation Ministry for closing down the HAL Airport, that is, Section 5A of the Aircraft Act, 1934 and Rules 11 and 78 of the Aircraft Rules 1937, and clause 5.5 of the Concession Agreement dealt with the opening of a new airport and not its closure; sufficient notice had not been given to the parties before the notification was issued (Staff Reporter, Thursday, May 22, 2008).

• The Government

The stand of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and its agencies showed apparent shifts and variations through the months leading to the AOD. The issue was debated intensely at the three-day conference on civil aviation organized by the Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation as Minister Praful Patel triggered it stating that even though the governments have to honor the agreement, a way out should be explored on giving a second airport for the technology centre. Yet, amid indications that no civilian flights will be allowed at Bangalore's HAL airport, the Union government announced the new international airport will open by the end of May 2008 and operator's license will be issued in a few days. This emerged after a meeting convened by the Civil Aviation Ministry attended by officials of the BIAL and Karnataka government. Replying to a pointed question whether the existing airport would be closed down the Union Secretary Civil Aviation stated that : "I suppose that is how it is working out" the new airport will start " functioning by month-end" as BIAL was " not agreeable to keep the existing airport open" However, as the Supreme Court directed the Centre to consider a citizen group's demand to keep the existing airport operational the Secretary also stated that talks were on with various stakeholders, including the airlines now operating at the HAL airport, on several options as to how it can be kept operational for civilian air traffic (PTI, 2008).

The reported stand of the state government displayed variations. The BJP made a pre-election promise that if voted to power it would lobby to keep the HAL airport open. The Chief Minister cheered the 'Keep HAL Airport Brigade' by stating that his government was strongly in

favour of retaining the HAL airport for short-haul flights. Stating that the he would like to go by the sentiments of the majority, and thus retain the HAL airport, he however clarified that "We don't want any investors to face loss. Many cities have two airports, and Bangalore should too" (DHNS, 2008).

The Information Technology minister said: "The state needs both airports. We're going to request the Central government to keep HAL airport open, at least till a second runway is built at BIA." At the CII's India Innovation Summit, the Minister said the government wants to retain HAL airport for short-haul flights. "Retention of HAL airport would be a great help for people flying to Chennai, Hyderabad and Thiruvananthapuram and back. We have several examples of cities where two or three airports are functioning. There is no bar for holding a dialogue, especially when it comes to infrastructure development issues" (TNN, 2008).

However, the Tourism Minister and Principal Secretary for Infrastructure Development dropped sufficient hints that HAL Airport would be closed once the International Airport at Devanahalli became operational. They asserted that as per the agreement the HAL Airport would have to be closed once the International Airport in Devanahalli is ready. "We know there is a demand for operating both airports; but we cannot breach the agreement. We have not yet received any communiqué from the Centre " (TNN, 2008).

• The BIAL Management

With the Union government taking the stand that contractual agreement cannot be abrogated unilaterally; "If it has to be worked out, then it has to be only with the active involvement of the airport management" it was left to BIAL to reiterate again and again that the contractual obligations bar a second airport in Bangalore. BIAL Chief Commercial Officer Stephen Widrig asserted that continuing the HAL airport was out of question and added such a step would not help anyone. "How can you have two airports that are miles away? Suppose a passenger wants to fly to Bangalore and has to take an international flight immediately, will it be possible if he lands at HAL airport? In any case, the concessionaire agreement expressly negates

the second airport. What the people and airlines need is one integrated airport with seamless connections" (OneIndia News, Sunday, June 10, 2007).

Outrightly rejecting the need for a second airport to the city, BIAL CEO Albert Brunner claimed that the new airport would be in a position to handle 2200 passengers during the peak hour and more than 10 million passengers in a year. "Looking at the growth of the sector in Bangalore, we are planning for taking up expansion in two years after the Airport was thrown open" Justifying the concession agreement he said that the new airport would be able to cater to the growing requirement. "For the next 20 to 25 years, there will not be any requirement for a second airport" he said adding that such a necessity could arise if the air traffic crossed 50 million a year (UNI, 2007).

7.3 and their Arguments

The arguments put forth by the advocates of the Save HAL campaign were as follows:

• Capacity Constraints

In May, the Karnataka High Court directed AAI and the Union government to assess the capacity of the new airport. A meeting was taken by Union Secretary, Civil Aviation on May 12, 2008 and as per para 7 of the meeting minutes, it was decided that AAI will undertake a study to assess the capacity of New Bangalore International Airport at Devanahalli. In pursuance of this decision, a team of AAI officers undertook the study from 16th June to 18th June 2008 at New Bangalore International Airport. The study was not released to the public and the details in it have not been corroborated by Bial, but portions were leaked to the press and gave a fresh

twist to the controversy. The salient points made in the study were as follows:

- During 2007-08, Bangalore International Airport handled 10.12 million passengers (1.55 million International passengers and 8.57 million domestic passengers). The share of Bangalore International Airport in India's traffic is 21% and 9.90% respectively for International and domestic traffic. Bangalore International Airport is the 4th busiest airport of India and handles 8.66% of India's total air traffic. Bangalore Airport has recorded the compound annual growth rate of 33.4% and 29.0% for International domestic passenger traffic respectively during the last five years (2002-03 to 2007-08).
- Peak hour and Annual capacity vis-à-vis Traffic Demand in confirmation with IATA norms is given below:
- Peak hour dynamic capacities have been worked out as 1200 passengers respectively for international and domestic wing corresponding annual capacities of 1.82 million and 7.96 million passengers.
- Peak hour current demand has been worked out as 1020 and 2640 respectively for international and domestic wing with the corresponding demand of 1.55 million and 8.57 million passengers.
- International wing is expected to saturate during 2008-09 when wing has already saturated. Terminal building at New Bangalore Airport is integrated terminal and therefore with the saturation of one terminal the entire terminal area is saturated. However if we consider highest peak hour go upto 582 passengers for international and 1570 passengers

Capacity vis-a-vis Demand and the year of saturation of Terminal Building					
Area	Peak Hour Demand (In Numbers)				
	Capacity*	Demand (June' 08)	Capacity*	Demand (2007-08)	Year
1	2	3	4	5	6
International	1200	1020	1.82	1.55	
Domestic	2400	2640	7.96	8.57	
Total	3600	3660	9.78	10.12	

- ☛ Since the demand for international is less than the capacity and domestic is more than the capacity, the swing is effectively utilization operation only. It will help in optimum utilization of available gates are shifted towards international side.
- ☛ Swing gates may be relocated by shifting towards International optimum utilization of the existing space available in the Terminal.
- ☛ Immediate action is to be taken create an additional capacity to avoid the further congestion handle the projected growth.
- ☛ Peak hour runway capacity is 32 movements as against the current peak hour demand of 25 movements. With the anticipated annual growth rate of 25 runway is likely to saturate during the year 2010-11. Therefore immediate action is to be taken for the construction of second runway to handle additional 10 million passengers' traffic per annum as proposed above.
- ☛ Existing number of parking bays are 42 (C-Code) as against the peak hour demand of 41 bays (26 passengers aircraft + 5 freighter + 10 buffer contingency). Therefore the addition of 30 more bays is also recommended.
- ☛ There is an imbalance between import and export cargo area which needs adjustment i.e. import cargo is saturated whereas export cargo and domestic cargo have adequate capacity. It is therefore recommended that an additional import cargo capacity may be created immediately.
- ☛ In view of the saturation of passengers terminal, import cargo, apron and runway, it is recommended that, in meantime, the existing HAL Airport may be permitted to operate until the time of commissioning of proposed additional capacity at New Bangalore International Airport.

The study maintained that new airport has been built to handle 9.78 million passengers much less than the 11.4 million passengers claimed by Bial; and at least 10% less than the capacity of the old HAL airport. The

AAI study also recommends that the old airport, run by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, or HAL, reopen until such time additional capacity is added at the new airport on Bangalore's outskirts. "In view of the saturation of passenger terminal, import cargo, apron and runway, it is recommended that, in meantime, the existing HAL airport may be permitted to operate until the time of commissioning of proposed additional capacity at the new Bangalore international airport". The Union ministry of civil aviation said the AAI committee had over-extended its mandate in its study. "They were asked to assess the demand and supply situation at the Bial airport and how to address it. They were not asked to make any recommendations. They have to involve Bial authorities for statistics." Later, the The Union civil aviation ministry has concluded after a fresh study that congestion is a problem at Bangalore's new airport only during peak traffic hours, which does not necessitate reopening the old city airport. The ministry had asked to reinforce arrangements to handle peak-hour traffic (Raghu & Shukla, 2008) (Shukla, 2008).

The official studies were no deterrent to the numerous bloggers who came up with their own estimates, replete with "gobbledygook of technical data about runways, ramps, airspace rights and peak hour movements". The following excerpt from Bangalore Aviation, a BlogSpot that tracked the entire HAL issue, is an example:

"Thanks to the economic boom in India, the liberalization of the aviation industry, and the efforts of the low cost carriers, who incidentally lead the global surge in aviation growth, Bangalore air traffic has exploded; to a growth level just not anticipated, let alone planned for. In the 36 month period that BIA was being constructed, traffic has grown 255% from 4.1 million passengers per annum (MPPA) to almost 10.5 MPPA. With all due respect to the capabilities of the BIAL consortium, I dare say, there is no infrastructure project in the world that can plan for, let alone handle this level of growth. From terminal to airplane stands to runway to airspace, an airport is a finely tuned integration of capacity points, and the old adage of a chain being as strong as its weakest link holds true. As all airports in India have shown us, the flexibility of human beings allows terminal capacity to exceed

100%. Also, the terminal design at BIA is modular, and I believe BIAL management claims, that it can be easily expanded. However, I must temper my belief, with the fact, that BIAL management has chosen not to expand the present terminal in 2007, despite seeing the explosive growth trends. What cannot be easily exceeded is apron, runway, and airspace capacity, for the cold hard rules of air safety dictate these operate at or below 100%, and the laws of physics determine long construction times. While BIA's terminal is a huge improvement over the AAI owned and operated terminal at HAL airport, BIA still has, only ONE runway, just like HAL airport. Under the safety rules of the DGCA, the runway can only handle 30 flights an hour (take-off or landing). It does not matter that the plane is a mega people moving Jumbo jet or a small commuter turbo-prop like an ATR or a cargo aircraft. Unlike vehicles on a road at rush hour, you cannot stop a plane in mid-air due to a traffic jam. Each flight has to be given a pre-determined flight slot. As per BIAL's own data, on its opening date, BIA's single runway, is already "fully booked" during the peak travel hours from 6AM - 10AM and from 6PM to 8PM. In fact the 6am-7am and 6pm-7pm hours are "over-booked", and we are still in the summer schedule which is a lean time for air travel all over India. Where will the additional demand that will come in the peak Winter season be accommodated? Future growth can only come by domestic flights during non peak hours and international flights later in the night. We use air travel for convenience, and I do not know many people willing to take a flight at non peak hours. BIAL has independently contracted Lufthansa Consulting (LHC) on two occasions to project air traffic in Bangalore before commencing construction. Thanks to their conservative projections, Bangalore has crossed BIAL's "Optimistic" figures for the year 2010, 3 years ahead in 2007 and the gap is only widening with each passing day. Many seasoned industry watchers believe the BIAL projections continue to be excessively conservative, and their projection of 21.4 million passengers by 2013 is unrealistically low. Using the real life example of India's best and largest airport, in terms of flight operations, Mumbai, the very best that BIA can achieve with its one runway is 15 million passengers"

By keeping HAL open in parallel, will allow BIA and Bangaloreans multiple benefits :

1. Extend the saturation date of BIA by another 4 years, possibly more
2. Shift smaller turbo-prop aircraft to HAL, thus opening the slots to more valuable larger jets
3. Improve productivity by cutting down commute times
4. Product differentiation by using HAL as a low cost low amenities airport.
5. Still gives BIA over 210% of its original traffic projections".

(Agarwal, The case for keeping HAL open in parallel with BIA, April 27, 2008).

• **The Exclusivity Clause**

When BIAL was conceived, a concession agreement was entered into with the Government of India, wherein the latter granted the exclusive right and privilege to BIAL to carry out the development, design, financing, construction, operation and management of the airport for a period of thirty years from opening date with an option to extend the concession for another 30 years. A number of other agreements were also in place to support the concession agreement. At the time of the concession agreement it was the policy of the Government of India that airports serving the large metropolitan areas shall have monopolistic rights of carriage; that is they were assured that no competing airports would be permitted to operate within a 150 km radius from them. In line with this, BIAL too was assured in the concession agreement that no new or existing airport will be permitted to operate as a domestic or international airport within 150 km. this meant that any new airport for a metropolitan area has to be considered in light of the existing one. But there were variations in the way this was implemented in different cities, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Pune, Mumbai, due to local considerations. Notwithstanding these, it was agreed in the Concession Agreement that when BIAL became operational, the old HAL airport would be denotified for commercial passenger traffic (CPP, IIMB, 2008).

When the matter was challenged before the High Court of Karnataka, the Attorney-General told the court that it was the Prime Minister who took the decision to close HAL airport for civilian and commercial operations. "It is wrong to say that HAL airport is closed. It is only closed for civilian and commercial operations. Since 1947, it was a civil enclave under the DGCA. The government has only withdrawn the permission granted earlier. The PM's decision was based on the report of the task force on infrastructure, wherein setting up of Greenfield airports was recommended. It was discussed that once the new international airports are set up; the civilian enclaves should be closed for civilian and commercial operations.

During the discussion organized by CPP, IIMB the then CEO of BIAL, pointed out that any breach of the concession agreement entered into with BIAL would make the government, both at the state and the centre, appear unreliable partners for future infrastructure projects, and affect the perception of India as an investment destination for the global community. At the same time, he also left open the possibility that BIAL may be satisfactorily indemnified for any losses it might face as a result of a decision to keep HAL open. Other panelists too, including the HAL representative, spoke of such a settlement. It was also suggested that BIAL and HAL could work out an arrangement between themselves regarding the operations of both airport in a mutually beneficial manner.

Senior aviation ministry officials, together with those from the Airports Authority of India and aviation regulator Directorate General of Civil Aviation discussed the matter with BIAL executives but no consensus was reached. "BIAL is not agreeing at all to commercial operations at the HAL airport. They are not even allowing Haj operations the old airport" (Shukla, 2008) (CPP, IIMB, 2008) (TNN, Mar 19 2010).

• Access and Connectivity

As the deadline to switch airports drew near, there was increasing consternation among certain sections of the public that the new airport may be ill-suited to serve a portion of the existing demand. Geography, a factor overlooked hitherto, came to the forefront of discourse.

During the last decade or so, Bangalore witnessed rapid development of its southern and south-eastern suburbs, whereas the new airport lay far to the north of the city. Mobility patterns for the city indicate high concentrations of employment related movement in the southern suburbs. Mysore also lay to the southwest, and there was development along Mysore road. As a result, a population, numbering over 2.5 million in the larger metropolitan region from south-west to south-east, including Hosur in Tamilnadu, faced the prospect of having to drive forty kilometers or more to reach the new airport, and sometimes through congested city areas, to reach Devanahalli. Given Bangalore traffic, it was estimated that travel from Majestic city centre to the new airport would take two hours; and an hour more from Bangalore South; including the three hour advance time for international travel, a resident would need six hours to catch an international flight, the same as going by road from Bangalore to Chennai!

Colourful press reports appeared about the travails of the passenger travelling from the south of the city. One of the colorful examples read as follows: "It's killing. There's no other way to describe it. It took us nearly three hours through numerous congested traffic junctions and suffocating pollution to get from Electronic City to the upcoming international airport in Devanahalli, a distance of 68 km. The Times of India undertook an exercise on November 5 to check out the exact nature of the travails one would have to go through to reach the airport. The distance and the poor accessibility to the airport has had everybody worried, and our exercise at evening peak hours proved it will probably be worse than what many imagined. By about the 25th kilometer from Electronic City, we were beginning to feel exhausted, and cab driver Paramesh was complaining about his legs paining from the constant clutching-braking. At times he would look and sound as if he regretted agreeing to make the trip. From our experience, here's what you need to be prepared for: if you are taking an international flight out of Bangalore which requires you be at the airport three hours prior to departure, then leave home at least five to six hours before the flight time. We say 'at least' because there's a good chance your cab will scrape or hit somebody in the bumper-to-bumper traffic, which might lead to

a hold-up. Take along plenty of water and snacks. If you have to stretch a little, take an AC cab. It may cost you about Rs 1,000 or more for a one-way trip to the airport, but it will probably be worth it. Finally, a plea to the state government and the Bangalore International Airport Ltd: Don't put Bangalore's citizens through this. We deserve better. For frequent travellers, it will be sheer nightmare. Find a quick solution" (TNN, 2007).

It was also reported that Mysore passengers "had to leave the city at least 10 hours prior to the departure of their international flights". Quoting estimates of trial runs by travel agencies, it was stated that the minimum time required to reach the airport at Devanahalli from Mysore was about six to seven hours during peak hours; taxi drivers and travel agencies operating in Mysore have an exact estimate of the duration required to reach HAL airport but not Devanahalli; and the traffic congestion beyond Kengeri increased travel time to ten hours (Krishna Kumar, 2008).

Various options to make access to the far-away new airport speedier had been considered, but the state government had been slow to implement such plans. The poor road connectivity to the upcoming Bangalore International Airport is again under fire and seems to be one of the biggest challenges before the new government. It now appeared that high speed access to the new airport was at least eighteen months away. Indeed, even the access through Bellary road to the north was only then being upgraded, with the deadline looming. A parallel rail option was also under consideration but this too was at least two years away, and there were reports that this plan might run into conflicts with some of the existing infrastructure plans of the National Highways Authority of India. High speed access, in any case, was a poor substitute for proximity. Lashing out at a "state government that has been asleep at the wheel", Ramesh Ramanathan wrote: "It's astonishing that we are talking about something as trivial as road connectivity at the 11th hour, four years after the concession agreement was signed, and eight years after the decision to locate the international airport at Devanahalli. A plea to Manmohan Singh and Praful Patel. When you come to Bangalore on 30 March to "inaugurate" the airport, don't parachute in

like VIPs. Instead, travel like the average passenger, toiling from Rajajinagar through West of Chord Road, battling the trucks across Peenya, getting stuck at the Yeshwantapur railway crossing, stop-starting across the 26km highway stretch sliced by 23 junctions with tractors and bicyclists and pedestrians, before bouncing over a 4km dust-track to finally get to the spanking new airport. Wouldn't it more fitting if the inauguration were on 1 April?" (Ramanathan, 2008).

A delegation led by N Reguraj, Chairman, CII, Karnataka, called on Chief Minister B S Yeddyurappa and expressed their serious concern that if the issue was not resolved it would create enormous stress on all air. The delegation suggested a 'mission-mode approach' on two fronts which include upgrading the existing infrastructure like Rail Over Bridges, Grade Separators, road widening, resurfacing and also building new infrastructure facilities like Metro link and expressway in a time-bound manner'; the setting up of a joint committee, in which industry, urban planning experts and others be given a role in ensuring that these projects are taken up and implemented with urgency; and offered to work closely with various government departments to resolve issues on infrastructure and connectivity. The chief minister assured support of the government in implementing these projects (DHNS, 2007) (DHNS, 2008).

Progress in ground infrastructure to reach the airport gradually picked up as the public criticism mounted. The government conceived and kick started implementation of the following plans for easy transport to the airport. The announced plans were countered by critics who pointed out their flaws. It is not clear how many of the proposals ultimately came to fruition, but the connectivity issue was resolved over a period of time.

- A six-lane national highway from Hebbal flyover, with Road over Bridges across two level crossings and a trumpet-shaped interchange for unhindered flow into the airport. The then Infrastructure Secretary stated that "We have got the technical evaluation done for the trumpet interchange, which will cost about Rs.40 crore". The CM wrote to NHAI, asking them to take up the interchange. But nearly 60 acres had to be acquired for the trumpet interchange

along the national highway. KIADB officials said this process had not even begun, though the Secretary maintained that the final notification would be issued within a week. Mr. Brunner said that BIAL would be spending an additional Rs.117 crore to connect the National Highway with the city. Initially there would be two road over bridges, with the third one planned involved in a land litigation in the Karnataka High Court. It would depend on land acquisition for the same by the State government (UNI, 2007).

☛ A proposal to build a dedicated double line rail link to connecting the airport to the city on BOOT system was submitted to the Cabinet. The proposed train was to start from BRV grounds on MG Road and reach the destination in 23 minutes. The road map to this Rs 4,000 crore project was prepared by Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited and presented to Infrastructure Minister. The Minister said that DMRCL conducted a feasibility study, soil study and survey and the government is awaiting for detailed project report. A portion of the BRV grounds, presently with the police department, was handed over to Bangalore Metro Rail. A committee headed by Chief Secretary P B Mahishi will meet home department officials to get some land in the proposed place". The high speed elevated train would be different from Metro. Principal Secretary to Infrastructure said the cost ratio is still being worked out. "We have approached BIAL to share equity". BIAL CEO Albert Brunner told newsmen that the Board of BAIL was open to a joint venture with the Railways and state government. The government and railways had realized the need for a rail link between airport and the city which "has to be implemented expeditiously. BIAL's plan has envisaged a rail facility within the airport and its upto the State Government to decide on a dedicated rail link" ((Times of India, 2006), (UNI , 2006) (UNI, 2006) (OneIndia News, 2007) (OneIndia News, Sunday, June 10, 2007).

☛ Two alternative routes were mooted: A dedicated road from the outer ring road that would go directly to the airport and a rail link from The Cantonment station to deposit passengers straight the flight boarding area. In place of a new, dedicated road, upgrade a major

district road via Hebbal and Hosakote by the public works department was proposed, and a feasibility report has been completed on the link and is still to be cleared by the Cabinet. To cater to international standards and also to avoid traffic problems, the state government has proposed to run a high-speed elevated train from MG Road to the under-construction airport in two years (Times of India, 2005).

☛ A decision to initiate an expressway from a point on Outer ring Road upto Devanahalli to tackle the traffic bottlenecks was taken by the Empowered Committee on Infrastructure meet. The expressway would act as a link road between the airport and the city. Chief Secretary B.K. Das said "The alignment for the expressway has been identified. It will run from Nagavara in Outer Ring Road straight upto Devanahalli. The expressway cuts through Peripheral ring Road as well. "The 30 km stretch will be an access-controlled road, with a width of 100 m. the 4-lane expressway will be implemented by BMRDA. Eighteen months ahead of the airport's scheduled opening, BMRDA began work on the expressway. R.K. Misra, member of empowered committee on Infrastructure said: "The project will require about 300 acres; it will take some land from the green belt as well as private land. The cost of land acquisition alone stands at Rs.300 crore. The entire project could escalate to much more. Because the project cuts through the Peripheral ring Road, the express can be linked on to the NH7. Apparently, plans are afoot to develop the area commercially and have malls and shopping centres so as to decongest roads into the city (Times of India, 2006). Bangalore Metropolitan Region Development Authority Commissioner that contrary to allegations made by the public, there had been no change in alignment in the proposed expressway between Outer Ring Road and Devanahalli. The confusion was due to differences between actual boundary marks and the existing land records. "The road alignment was done based on aerial surveys and other methods. When the proposed survey numbers are superimposed on the village maps, they don't tally because the existing land records haven't been updated" (DHNS, 2007).

☛ The two ROBs at Dodjala and near the ITC factory were half-done. The South Western railway, which has undertaken the construction, is said to have been hit by escalating steel prices. Kumar said "We are hoping that the ROBs will be ready in about 10 months."

Till these plans fructified, the government looked at the alternative introducing express and ordinary bus services between the airport and the various important points in the city. The BMTC rolled out Bangalore's first dedicated bus lane to exclusively ferry airport passenger deploying 40 A/C Volvo buses. "Forty Volvo buses with frequency of 10-15 minutes each will ply to Devanahalli. It would offer the commuter value for money, comfort and safety and reduce travel time" said Dastagir Sherieff, Chief Traffic Manager (Operations) BMTC. Lane marking began in January and trial runs began towards January-end and February. The plan is to ready the lane before the airport is inaugurated in March. The BMTC and transport department received the go-ahead to execute the project following the submission of a comprehensive report on the lane system by traffic expert M.N. Sreehari. The dedicated bus lane is meant to ensure quick travel time on brand-new low-fare Volvos and also to avoid breakdowns. "The world over, Volvos driving in bus lanes have a 0.001% breakdown rate and this will be the case here too. We have also recommended that new BMTC buses be used for the low-fare sector," Sreehari said. The plan was to cover the distance between Hebbal flyover and airport in 25 minutes. Initially, there were no provisions to install bus stops along the way, but owing to good passenger flow, bus stops were tentatively planned for every 2 km. The Hebbal BMTC depot doubled up as the departure hub for passengers coming in from the Outer Ring Road, Vijaynagar and Koramangala. Passengers from Bangalore East and South-East could proceed to the airport without a detour on a direct road. The bus lane was marked by two yellow lines using thermoplastic paint, and the lane will be marked: 'For Buses Only'. The BMTC also arranged to have an in-house porter on every Volvo bus to assist passengers with their luggage. The police manned the lane for a while to ensure only buses drive on it and Barriers were put up at regular points along the lane. Later the BMTC extended the dedicated airport services to non-

airport passengers as well. Non-flyers were allowed to travel up to Hebbal last point in both directions on the Suvarna and Vayu Vajra services. The Vayu Vajra service scored high on customer feedback but there were reports that the corporation is running the premium service on a loss due to low occupancy. BIAL117 (TNN, 2008) (TNN, 2007).

The BMTC also introduced chauffeur-driven limousine service with a dedicated helpline to pick-up and drop off air passengers. The Managing Director, BMTC said 40 high-end cars would be purchased to service passenger traffic to Devanahalli airport. "A branded service will be established with a helpline number that will co-ordinate the logistics. Travellers to the airport can dial the helpline number and a cab will be at their doorstep. The cab will drop off the passenger at the nearest Volvo airport service point from where he will be taken to the airport". "Fares for the limousine service will be decided by the BMTC in January. We hope to get the service running by the time the airport is functional in March 2008. Plans are afoot to have an arrangement with airline operators to transport travellers from Star hotels".

Finally, there was word of India's first helicopter service within the city. Deccan Aviation announced a chopper service from BIA to various points in the city. Initially scheduled to start operations on the same day as BIA it was later rescheduled to July 2008. A Bell 206 Jet Ranger, Deccan Skylimo, was deployed for operations from BIA to Electronic City, Whitefield and HAL. "Helicopter service to Palace Grounds will be added shortly," said a company release. Priced at Rs 5,800 for a one-way journey from BIA to Electronics City and Rs 4,800 from BIA to HAL, the service included a cab pick-up at the terminal building to ferry passengers to the heliport, located a kilometer away from the airport. The charter service will start at 6.30 am and the last drop to BIA will be at 6 pm daily, with regular frequency. Passengers availing of the service would be able to book tickets at designated ticketing counter at the airport, heliport and Deccan Aviation's head office at Jakkur aerodome (TNN, 2008).

• **Arrival Airport?**

In Delhi, it appeared that the one-airport policy would be discarded as the area under the exclusivity clause

intruded into a second state, and the Government of Uttar Pradesh was planning a new airport in Greater Noida, only seventy kilometers from Indira Gandhi International Airport. In Bangalore too plans for commercial operations were on in Puttaparthi airport in Andhra Pradesh. BIAL argued that a new airport in Hosur would be precluded by the Concession Agreement, but judging by the example of the new proposed airport at Noda, it was likely that neighboring states that were not party to the agreement would not feel bound by it. In that case Tamilnadu or Andhra Pradesh could insist on their independent right to develop an airport within their borders without being constrained by a concession agreement between BIAL and Karnataka. To forestall that, it would be more efficient to retain the economic benefits linked to HAL airport and even to try to draw traffic from the growing twin city of Hosur, giving less room for the development of an airport outside the state (CPP, IIMB, 2008, p. 15).

• **Dual Airports as an International Phenomenon**

It was pointed out that more than 25 cities, including New York, Washington DC, Paris are served by two or more airports each carrying several million passengers a year. The average catchment area of such is typically 300-400 square kilometers each, roughly half the size of the current municipal area of Bangalore. Major metropolitan airports of the country, Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai all have firm plans for the establishment of new airports. Whatever the merits of an exclusion zone granted to BIAL, it appeared that other metros were able to demand and obtain exceptions to the single airport policy of the Civil Aviation Ministry. Therefore, if the 'one airport per metro' policy was applied only to Bangalore, and if the Centre itself abandoned the policy in its new aviation policy it would be advisable for Bangalore to be certain that it suffers no discrimination among metros on account of this policy. (CPP, IIMB, 2008, p. 16).

• **Hub for Domestic, Low-cost, Short-haul Traffic**

The CEO BIAL expressed the view that for Bangalore to develop a strong air traffic hub for South India, it was important that BIAL be allowed to function as the only airport in the city. Without this he argued, a

single airport could not consolidate the feeder demand from nearby smaller cities and towns, and thereby grow naturally into a significant airline hub. This view was challenged by proponents of HAL who pointed out that Chennai was already an important gateway serving such a hub function for much of Tamilnadu and a portion of neighboring states. Similarly Hyderabad too was positioning itself to perform such a function for a catchment area around itself. Thus BIAL would face considerable competition from other airports in pursuing this objective. Also it was likely that other cities, especially those outside Karnataka, would demand their own airports, including international services. Moreover the chief purpose of Bangalore's airports should be to serve the travel demands of the population of this city, and not plan their operations with an eye on consolidating the travel needs of other places. The government should therefore determine whether BIAL should develop into a hub for travelers from nearby towns and cities and if so, how should the travel needs of those Bangalore itself be reconciled with the objective of developing a strong airline hub? It was also asked whether HAL airport could function as a hub for low-cost, short-haul flights only, and would this affect the establishment of BIAL as hub, or give travelers further reason to connect their onward flights through Bangalore. The decision would likely have impacts beyond Karnataka, and this was something the government should be alert to as well. The operation of an airport in southeast Bangalore had economic advantages and inevitably there would be interest in Tamilnadu or Andhra Pradesh to develop a Greenfield facility across the state at a location that would be accessible to a large group of existing industries and emerging new housing region (CPP, IIMB, 2008, pp. 14-15).

Prophesying that "fears are coming true", supporters of Save HAL claimed that BIAL would discourage travelers flying on short-haul routes -those that have a flight time between 30 minutes and an hour. "Those who are travelling before March 30, when the new airport opens, and plan to come back after March 30, are booking onward flight tickets but are wary about booking their return tickets. Passengers having to fly out of the city from the new airport are thinking twice if their

chosen destinations are on the short-haul sectors". The argument was that the distance and the expense made rail and road options more attractive to the visiting-relatives-and-friends segment of passengers who formed over 70% of short-haul destination flights. "If people find train and bus travel to be a smarter option, then airlines will have to discontinue certain short-haul routes or rationalize their frequency on some". Short-haul routes are unlikely to increase despite the new airport's capacity a 26% increase in domestic flights compared to what HAL airport currently handled (Dhamija, 2008).

• **Economic Activities linked to an Airport**

Inevitably, a range of businesses come up around any airport directly linked to the travel industry, but also to serve the secondary needs of establishments. It was argued that over the course of its operation in East Bangalore, HAL Airport has created a large ecosystem in the tourism, travel, software, engineering, services and other industries that critically rely on the connectivity it provides to other cities and the rest of the world. The likely economic impact of disrupting this ecosystem was highlighted. A number of large firms have made huge investments in south and southeast Bangalore, and would not like their choice of Bangalore as an investment destination disrupted by the closure of HAL airport. The air traffic now originating from the southern suburbs would cease or diminish its use of air travel itself as a result of the increased distance to the new airport. Would such firms relocate some of their key offices within Bangalore metropolitan area itself, or prefer to locate significant operations in other cities? Economic disruption was also anticipated for the thousands of other businesses that indirectly relied on HAL airport traffic. Whether these too would find alternate sources of revenue, or move their operations, or face closure was a question.

• **Monopoly Profiteering**

One reason for the debate over HAL airport was that past estimates of demand for air travel in Bangalore proved to be severe under-estimates, as the city had grown dramatically. The early negotiations for the establishment of a new airport took place during a period

of low growth in air travel; the concession agreement was finalized during a period of moderate growth, and the construction of the airport took place during a period of unprecedented growth. As a result, there was a significant mismatch between the projected travel demand on which basis BIAL was constructed, and the actual volumes of traffic witnessed in recent years. Soon after signing its contract BIAL commissioned Lufthansa Consulting in 2005 to undertake a revised traffic study, given Bangalore's explosive air traffic growth. LHC's most optimistic estimates projected 10.1 million passengers by 2010, but Bangalore already clocked over 10 million passengers in 2008. More realistically, BIAL estimated that passenger traffic would reach 11.3 million in 2015, but this mark was crossed by 2008. "This was new territory for Indian governments, as we witness the underestimation of a runaway economy". Given the growth in traffic volume, there was no question that BIAL would make out even better than the returns that it projected when it won the tender, even if HAL airport were kept open.

There were comments in the media from top airline executives based in Bangalore that the closure of HAL airport would amount to the establishment of BIAL as a private monopoly. Whereas the public monopoly HAL airport could ostensibly be defended as serving a greater good identified by governments, there could be no rationale for creating private monopolies. The UK Competition Commission's recommendations of creating healthy competition among airports and abolishing the monopoly for the benefit of travelling public in particular and entire aviation in general was quoted : "Competition is a dynamic and inherently uncertain process, and it is therefore difficult to anticipate precisely how competition between Edinburgh and Glasgow will benefit customers. Based on our assumptions, we would expect discounts on existing services at Edinburgh to increase to the level already present at Glasgow, generating a present value of benefits to customers of at least 40 million. In addition to that, we would expect further benefits from each of the two airports responding to competition from the other; from new services being launched at both airports; and in the longer term from capacity developments and service levels at both airports

being more closely aligned with customer interests". The specific case of competition between Glasgow Airport and Glasgow Prestwick Airports, situated at a distance of approx 41 kms was detailed "There is evidence to suggest that airlines compete with one another and the prices demonstrate that introducing rivalry between airports can have a real impact on market outcomes". (Appendix-10.4; UK Competition Commission Report on BAA in (Joint House Committee, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, Thirteenth Assembly, 2009). Industry executives also pointed out that BIAL itself had selected two providers for almost all its services in the interest of competition. As a private monopoly, BIAL might put airlines in a difficult position of having to accept the various charges levied by the airport operator, which were also described as much higher than elsewhere. There were news reports of airlines cutting back their plans for service to Bangalore in response to high fees demanded by BIAL and the perceived infeasibility of operations from the new airport. Passengers travelling to the new airport will not only travel longer but will have to fork out much larger airport fees.

• Requirement of Infrastructure

But in Bangalore, we are going to do something extraordinarily stupid. Even as we struggle to build much-needed infrastructure in the country, Bangalore will actually witness the first instance of shutting down existing infrastructure.

• Connectivity between Airports

Officials of BIAL and the Union Government pointed out that it was impractical for airlines to provide service into the same city at two different airports. Would airlines choose to forego service to one or the other? The global experience in answer to these questions was not uniform. In some cities with two or more airports such as Chicago, Dallas Fort Worth, Paris, London, some airlines provide service to only one of these airports. But there are also examples such as the Washington DC area where the same airlines provide service to more than one airport.

• Safety Considerations

BIAL submitted to the Karnataka High Court that the HAL Airport was perhaps, the only defence testing and

research facility in the world accommodating civilian aircraft movement. Defending the closure of HAL Airport, BIAL said such an accommodation not only imperils the safety of passengers and defence pilots but also raises concerns of national security. The car parking facility which is very close to the HAL Airport, could have been used by terrorists. Moreover, several major accidents have occurred at the HAL Airport. Test flights of aircraft manufactured by HAL and National Aerospace Limited and Airborne Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) were carried out at the HAL Airport along with operations of commercial airlines. It said mixed traffic of military and commercial flights is not conducive to flight safety. The civil enclave is the only one in the country to share its air activities with that of a manufacturer of aircrafts and helicopters. The fuel complex of Indian Oil, which refuels aircraft, is situated adjacent to the car park and the fuel browsers have to pass through the parking lot, which is not only a security but environmental hazard too (Mar 11, 2010).

• The options explored

- **Building public opinion.** Based on its capabilities and pursuant to its interest in actively engaging policy questions in government, the CPP organized a half day seminar on 3/3/2008 to discuss questions pertinent to the looming closure of the HAL airport. The seminar's objective was to create a meaningful discourse between the stakeholders about an infrastructure project that could irrevocably affect the future of the city and the citizens of Bangalore and Karnataka. In addition, the CPP proposed to develop recommendations for the government on the choices available at the time. (CPP, IIMB, 2008, p. 4).
- **A negotiated outcome.** To explore these options, the government could engage in a consensus building exercise to determine whether a satisfactory middle ground between the various contending positions can be found. How viable this option was, and whether the various stakeholders remain open to a consensus building exercise to find a middle ground, was uncertain. The government could invite the participants to a second meeting, this time in a closed to the public format that would permit such an eventuality to be explored (CPP, IIMB, 2008).

➤ *A decision to reopen the HAL airport for commercial flight operations as recommended by the Joint Committee of the Karnataka Legislature would be an elaborate legal process and would involve all parties concerned, a top official of the State government said.* The House Committee in its report tabled in the Legislature on Monday recommended to the Government to reopen the HAL airport for short distance flights and regional flights. The official told Deccan Herald that the recommendation of the committee on the HAL airport was in line with the Parliamentary Standing Committee report on Transport, Tourism and Culture headed by Sitaram Yechury in 2008 and will have to involve the Centre and the State Governments and the airport promoter.

"The panel has only reflected the popular sentiment. While the Greenfield airport policy was supported by the State Government, the prerogative of reopening the HAL airport is in the domain of the Centre, provided the Defence Ministry that owns the HAL airport and the promoters/operator of the BIAL have no objection" the source said. However, for this to materialize, the State government has to accept the recommendations of the JHC, either in part or in toto. Then the State government has to write to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Civil Aviation for initiating fresh negotiations on the reopening of HAL airport. This, the source said, can move forward only if the operator of BIAL has no objection to any possible amendment in the Concession Agreement that has granted the rights and immunities to the commercial partner by the sovereign Government of India. "The CA has clearly mentioned the closure of the HAL airport and not allowing any domestic (except for Mysore and Hassan) or international airport to be developed in an aerial distance of 150 kms of BIAL. So, all parties to the agreement have to renegotiate the CA," the sources added (Dhaneshkar, Dec 22 2009).

Litigation : Several individuals and citizen forums filed Public Interest Litigations in the High Court of Karnataka against the decision of closing Hal airport for commercial operations after opening of the new airport. The closure of the old airport was challenged

in court by a citizens' group. Citizens groups and top companies in Bangalore lobbied for reopening the old airport complaining commute to the new airport takes up to two hours from the city and the Union government is encouraging a private monopoly by letting it be the only one open in the city (Raghu & Shukla, 2008) (Committee & Department, 2008).

The government may assess the risk of the policy being challenged successfully in the courts. The division bench of the High Court in its order dated 16/4/2008 did not deem fit to pass any interim order as requested by the petitioners and held that *"From and with effect from the date on which Airport Opening occurs Gol will issue and publish and appropriate notification stating that the Existing Airport is no longer open or available for commercial civil aviation operations (which shall, for these purposes, not include use for Airport activity at times of national emergency or (at anytime) by aircraft owned or operated by or for the Indian Air Force or other Armed Forces of India or for transportation of dignitaries by special government hired VIP aircraft or otherwise for their use or activities) and that it is no longer classified as a civil enclave under the AAI Act"* was an integral part of the Concession Agreement; the parties to the agreement accepted and acted upon this condition and the construction of the new airport has been completed. The High Court had also observed that from 2004 onwards it was known to the public that once the new international airport is opened, the HAL airport will be closed for commercial operations and that the distance of 35-40 kms cannot be said to be unusual or abnormal for an international airport in city like Bangalore. However, in the light of the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee, the Court directed Gol, GoK and AAI to immediately consider the suggestion to renegotiate with BIAL and to explore the possibilities of minimizing, if not completely removing, the inconvenience and difficulties of people. With this directive, the High Court posted the petitions for final disposal in the second week of June 2008 (Committee & Department, 2008) (CPP, IIMB, 2008, p. 16).

"BIAL had raised funds based on terms and conditions in the concessional agreement. We are not in favor

of restraining the respondent governments from honoring and giving effect to concessional agreement. But, keeping in mind the larger public interest and minimizing the hardship, the renegotiation may be held as far as the user development fee and also retaining of the HAL airport, the suggestions put forth by the committee", the division Bench observed in its 14-page interim order. Not satisfied with the High Court order, the petitioners filed a SLP before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court refused to interfere and dismissed the SLP. (Committee & Department, 2008) (TNN, Aug 12, 2009).

8. Analysis

The controversy that broke out and the public campaign to retain the HAL airport is symptomatic of the dilemmas that governments face in implementing ppps in the India context. The crux lies the balancing of the mandate contractual governance with the compulsions of popular politics. In most instances of Indian electoral politics, the general consensus is that the compulsions of populism override those of principle, law or even ethics. However, in the case of HAL, the governments of India and Karnataka chose to keep their contractual obligations above that of considerations of popularity. Despite mouthing sentiments in favour of keeping HAL airport open, they ultimately chose to take the legal rather than the political route towards resolving the issue. This is an unusual, at least in the light of popular perception about the polity of India.

The implementation of long gestation megaprojects with 25-30 year timelines requires a stability of policy structure and political and bureaucratic decisionmaking. Shifts of popular sentiment, on the other hand, need display no such restraint. This leads states to display inconsistencies in its stand, compounded when there is a change of the ruling political combination or party. In BIAL's case, there was a change from the Congress when construction began to successive coalition governments midway and finally the Bharatiya Janata Party when the airport was launched. Foreign investors are ill-equipped to handle policy shifts, particularly on critical issues such as exclusivity. The theme that any modification may affect future investment sentiment is reiterated gain and again in the discourse of BIAL.

As we have seen, the location was selected after a careful comparative evaluation. It was by no means a casual or easy choice. From all available evidence it does not appear that there has been any political interference at any stage at the point of site. On being questioned on this aspect, the interview respondents who was involved in the site selection emphatically stated that there was no political interest or interference at that point of time. Nor was there any competition between different locations for being chosen for the purpose. To that extent, the Committee was free to select an appropriate site, based on operational constraints only.

The question arises whether the Committee itself have been blind to the distance between the city and the Devanahalli site? It is clear that committee had to keep in mind several parameters, physical conditions, type of terrain, surrounding obstructions; availability of utilities such as power and water, accessibility to ground transport, availability of land for future expansion, technical factors such as the presence of other airports in the vicinity, so distance was only one item among the multiple factors to be considered.

Notwithstanding this, it is clear that the Committee, particularly Dr.Valluri, was alive to the distance factor, motivated as much by fuel savings than passenger convenience. That this issue was discussed extensively is evident from the detailed minuting particularly on this issue. On the discussion regarding Vijayapura, the proceedings state as follows: "Keeping in view the distance from Bangalore, accessibility by land, the commuting time needed for thousands of vehicles making round trips from the airport, Vijayapura which was located 55 kms from Bangalore City Centre was not suitable. It was estimated that a typical automobile which gives about 10 km per litre and may cost Rs.20.00 per litre in 2000 AD. The additional ground transportation cost per passenger the additional ground transportation cost per passenger will almost be about Rs.180 for a round trip beyond Yelahanka (taken as a reference point for comparison) or about Rs.6.66 crores per thousand passengers daily per year. Assuming that about half the estimated passengers, 10000 per day, travelled by their own transportation, the fuel cost for ground transportation will be about Rs.30-35 crores per year. The ground transportation

cost would be about Rs.5-10 crores, a total of Rs.40-45 crores per year. The Committee felt that at a time when the nation is desperately trying to save fuel which at present costs about Rs.15000 per year in foreign exchange; fuel consumption for transportation is an important determining factor in the choice of airport location. Further, ground transportation time one way could be about 1.5 to 2 hours. This would be in addition to the time that will necessarily have to be spent at the airport due to delays in departure and arrival of planes. Thus, the total time unproductively spent in commuting or waiting in the airport will certainly affect adversely the time which passengers need to spend on their business and other professional/personal work. Considering from these points of view the Committee was not in favour of selecting this site". Again the minutes state: "In the meeting, Dr.SR Valluri expressed his apprehension for construction of the aerodrome at a site located at a distance of 55 km from the city. He expected that by the year 2000 itself, the load will be about 10000 passengers per day and the cost of fuel for ground transportation would amount to Rs.35 crores per year which a country like India can ill afford." These extracts make it clear that the Committee was very alive to the distance factor, and but for this alertness the new airport would have been located at Vijayapura, 75 km from Bangalore. In his memoirs he states: "The Karnataka government offered land about 75 km from the city centre. I could not visit the place. The other committee members approved it. Clearly, they did not do their homework or appreciate the problems air travellers would face if the airport were to be located so far away. The time for travel from city center to airport for travel to nearby cities like Chennai, would double; clearly not an acceptable solution. The Committee also made a genuine effort to secure the Yelahanka site from the Air Force, and it was only when this too failed that Devanahalli emerged as the final consensus after a process of elimination" (Valluri, 2006) (Interview with former Director, NAL & Member , Site Selection Committee).

From inception, industry associations were participants in the exercise, and completely privy to decisionmaking, again giving lie to later accusations of opaqueness and lack of transparency.

One development that the Committee could not have foreseen at the time was the tremendous growth of the IT sector in Bangalore and its concentration in the South of Bangalore city. As we saw in Chapter 4, this was the consequence of a series of policy and circumstantial factors. By the time BIA was constructed in 2008, the Golden Crescent of Whitefield, Hosur-Sarjapur and Koramangala had emerged as the main feeder to the airport, and it was this group that was most inconvenienced by the relocation to Devanahalli. As the IIMB report states: "During the last decade or so, Bangalore has witnessed rapid development of its southern and south-eastern suburbs, extending all the way upto Hosur in Tamilnadu, whereas the proposed new airport is far to the north of the city. Mobility patterns clearly indicate high concentrations of employment-related movement in the southern suburbs, and as newer establishments keep coming up in the area, this is likely to mount even further. And Karnataka's own second city, Mysore, is to the south-west, and there has been plenty of development along Mysore Road, which may accelerate once the infrastructure corridor project to that city is sorted out". But this was certainly not something that could be foreseen in 1992.

Aside from the public policy perspective, there is an interesting legal issue here. Non-contractibility, the incapacity of negotiating parties to completely anticipate and prepare for all contingencies, is a recurrent theme in PPP literature (Hart, 2003) (Besley & Ghatak, 2006) (Stewart-Smith, 1995) The exclusivity clause which became the focus of debate was in fact a demand that had been agreed upon much as early as the 1990s, much before the Siemens consortium entered the fray. It is obvious that the contingency of reworking the contract on such a critical point was not envisaged, leading both the Union and the state governments to lay the onus of alteration on BIAL management.

The power of an intelligent articulate section of society to rally around a demand was an important aspect of this episode. But the shifts of perspective and popular sentiment was manifest. The new airport for Bangalore was championed largely by the new IT economy and the middle-classes that formed the bulk of its workforce. For a period in BIAL's early history, The Chairman of Infosys,

which epitomized the new economy in Bangalore, held office as its Chairman. The need for a new airport is reiterated in popular middleclass discourse of the Bangalore South. But, when faced with the prospect of travelling 30 odd kilometers to the new airport, this group effected a complete turnaround, and began to criticize not just the distance, but almost every aspect of the airport's design and features. This group was also able to intelligently articulate their views through a variety of devices, chiefly newspapers and blogs. The fickleness of public opinion was nowhere more in evidence.

Through the entire drama, the media had a field day. Dailies such as Times of India tracked the Save HAL campaign day after day. Headlines screamed: For several months this was a regular feature, until the improvement in connectivity, the familiarization of the new airport to passengers, and the litigating of the issue in the court removed it gradually from the forefront of public interest.

9. Conclusion

The ultimate fate of the HAL airport will be decided in the courts. Yet the Save HAL episode forms an important chapter in BIAL's history. For all the heat that it generated, the campaign was not successful in persuading either BIAL or governments to reopen HAL. This was for several reasons: the mandates of contractual governance proved greater than the compulsions of political popularity. Thus, even while mouthing sentiments such as: and exploring options, the governments ultimately joined the chorus rather than determining its direction. In itself, this was an important instance of political will in action, though not in vocabulary. Also, the campaign failed in its purpose also because the cause it propounded ultimately only a small section of Bangalore's population. The users of Bangalore South were only a small section of Bangalore's population, albeit prosperous and voiced. Most users who hailed from other parts of the city were either indifferent, or frankly relieved at escaping the obnoxious traffic of the Old Airport Road. This, rather than the firmness of governments or the clauses of the Concession Agreement, have proved decisive so far.

Bibliography

- 141st report of the Department related Parliamentary Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture on 'Functioning of Private Airports & related issues'. (2008). 142ND report of the Department related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture on 'Modernization of Airports'. 33. New Delhi, New Delhi, India: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, Parliament of India.
- 141st report of the Department related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture on 'Modernization of Airports'. (2008, 8). 141st report of the Department related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture on 'Modernization of Airports'. 17. New Delhi, New Delhi, India: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, Parliament of India.
- Agarwal, D. (2008, June Sunday 22). Hard work at BIAL results in significant improvement. (d. Agarwal, Ed.) Retrieved 02 09, 2010, from Bangalore Aviation: <http://www.bangaloreaviation.com/search/label/BIAL?updated-max=2008-08-26T19%3A44%3A00%2B05%3A30&max-results=20>
- Agarwal, D. (April 27, 2008). The case for keeping HAL open in parallel with BIA. Retrieved 05 12, 2010, from Bangalore Aviation : <http://www.bangaloreaviation.com/2008/04/case-for-keeping-hal-opening-in.html>
- Allan, J. R. (2001). Public Private Partnerships:A Review of Literature and Practice. 1-42.
- Benjamin, S. (2000). Governance, economic settings and poverty in Bangalore. Environment and Urbanization, 12 (35), 1-23.
- Besley & Ghatak, T. M. (2006). Public Goods and Economic Development. In A. V. Abhijit Banerjee, Understanding Poverty (p. 496). Oxford University Press.
- Bhattacharya, S. (30/04/2008). Patel asks BIAL to okay small planes from HAL airport. dnaindia.
- Blaxter, L., Hughes, C., & Tight, M. (2002). How to Research (2nd ed.). Buckingham, MK, UK: Open University Press.

- Boardman, A. E., Poschmann, F., & Vining, A. R. (2005). North American infrastructure P3s; examples and lessons learned. In G. Hodge, & C. e. Greve, *The challenge of public private partnerships: learning from international experience* (Vol. 1, pp. 162-189). Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
- Civilian flights at HAL Airport imperil passenger safety: BIAL. (Mar 11, 2010). *The Hindu*.
- Commerce and Industries department. (25/10/1996). C:604:96:C112TC96: Establishment of anew airport of international standard near Devanahalli- TechnoEconomic feasibility report furnished by the Tata Consortium- fixation of price for land to be allotted to the prokject. Bangalore: Governemnt of Karnataka.
- Committee, J. H., & Department, I. D. (2008). Constitution of Joint legislative Committee to study the implementation and working of Bangalore International Airport- ilnformation relating to the issues listed in the Minor Publication Part-2 dated 18/09/2008 under SI. No.29. Government of Karnataka., Joint House Committee; Infrastructure Developemnt Department. Bangalore: Govt of Karnataka; Joint House Committee; Infrastructure Developemnt Department.
- Core Group. (1991). Comparative Statement of Sites Inspected by Selection Committee. Core Group Evaluation Report, National Airports Authority, ARA(Planning) Directorate.
- Core Group of Site Selection Committe. (25.10.1991). Feasibility Study of Yelahanka Aerodrome for upgradation as Aerodrome of International Standards: Confidential. Confidential Report.
- CPP, IIMB. (2008). HAL airport: to close or not to close? 3 (pp. 1-16). 29: IIMB.
- Creswell, J. W. (1994). *Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Thousand Oaks; London; New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- D.O.letter from S.Ramanathan, IAS (Retd), Chairman, Committee for recommending a new site for Bangalore Airport to S.Kanungo, Secretary, Civil Aviation, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Govt.of India, 26/06/1992. (n.d.).
- Deccan Herald. (2001, 12 6). CM Krishna leads from the front. Deccan Herald.
- DeccanHerald. (2002, 2 15). Fast-forward progress. Deccan Herald.
- Deutsche Bank Research; Heymann; Just; Lowijk; Vath. (2007). 450 bn reasons to invest in India's Infrastructure. DeutscheBank, DeutscheBank Research. Deutsche Bank.
- Dhamija, A. (2008, 2 28). Short-haul flyers shun new airport. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from Times of India: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>
- Dhaneshkar, S. P. (Dec 22 2009). BIAL will have a say in HAL airport reopening. Deccan Herald.
- DHNS. (2008, 7 17). Govt wants to keep HAL open. Retrieved 12 18, 2008, from Deccan Herald: <http://deccanherald.com>
- DHNS. (2007, 6 7). No change in expressway alignment. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from Deccanherald: <http://www.deccanherald.com>
- Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. *Academy of Management Review*, 14, 57-74.
- (1992-93). Extract from Speech of S.Bangarappa, Chief Minister of Karnataka State on Budget 1992-93 at under heading Tourism.
- Ganesan, A. (1991, 3 19). D.O.No. AV.20014/2/90-VB from A.V.Ganesan, Secretary, Civil Aviation, Govt.of India to Shri.Prabhakar Rao, Chief Secretary, Govt.of Karnataka.
- Government of Karnataka. (7/12/1998). Note on New Domestic & International Airport at Devanahalli near Bangalore. Internal Note, Government of Karnataka, Bangalore.
- Greve, C., & Hodge, G. (2005). Introduction. In G. Hodge, & C. e. Greve, *The challenge of public private partnerships: learning from international experience* (pp. 1-21). Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.

- Grimsey, & Lewis. (2005). Introduction. In *The Economics of Public Private Partnerships*.
- Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. K. (2004). *The Governance of Contractual Relationships in Public-Private Partnerships*. *The Journal of Corporate Citizenship* , 15, 19-38.
- Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. (2005). *The Economics of Public Private Partnerships* (2005 ed.). (D. Grimsey, & M. Lewis, Eds.) Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: (International Library of Critical Writings in Economics Series #183), International Library of Critical Writings in Economics Series, Darrin Grimsey, Barnes & Noble.
- Hall, T., & Hubbard, P. (1996). *The Entrepreneurial City: New Urban Politics, New Urban Geographies*. *Progress in Human Geography* , 20 (2), 153-74.
- Hammersley, M. (1992). *What's Wrong with Ethnography?* London: Routledge.
- Hart. (2003). *Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public Private Partnerships*. *Economic Journal* , 113 (486), C69-C76.
- Hodge, G., & Greve, C. e. (2005). *The challenge of public private partnerships: learning from international experience* (Vol. 1). Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
- India Today, 2. (n.d.).
- Indian Airlines. (1991). *Bangalore Airport: Persepctive Plan*. Director (Planning).
- Jenkins, R. (2007). *Political Skills: Introducing Reform by Stealth*. In R. Mukerji, *India's Economic Transition: The Politics of Reforms* (pp. 170-201). New Delhi: OUP.
- Jessop, B. (2003). *The Future of the Capitalist State*. Polity Press.
- Joint House Committee, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, Thirteenth Asssembly. (2009). *Report on Examination of Construction of Bangalore International Airport*. Karnataka Legislative Assembly, Thirteenth Asssembly. Bangalore: Government of Karnataka.
- Kamath, L. (2006). *Achieving Global Competitiveness and Local Poverty Reduction? Examining the public-private partnering model of governance in Bangalore*. Ph.D Thesis, Rutgers University, New Jersey.
- Kappan, R. (2004, Mar 10). *Airport bursting at the seams*. *The Hindu*.
- Kappan, R. (2006, Feb Monday 13). *Chaos reigns supreme at Bangalore airport*. *The Hindu*, p. Front Page.
- Karnataka Legislative Assembly. (2008). *Karnataka Legislative Assembly Debates: Official Report: Part 1*. Extract of Legislative Assembly Debate, Karnataka Legislative Assembly.
- Krishna Kumar, R. (2008, 05 23). *Hard times ahead for air travellers*. Date: 23/05/2008 URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/05/23/stories/2008052352221100.htm> , p. 1.
- Kundu, A. (2000). *Urban Development, Infrastructure Financing and Emerging System of Governance in India: A Perspective*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Lok Sabha, Parliament of India. (2008). *General Discussion on the Budget for the State of Karnataka for 2008-09*. Retrieved 26/12/2008, from Lok Sabha: <http://164.100.47.132>
- Lok Sabha, Parliament of India. (n.d.). *Lok Sabha, Parliament of India*. Retrieved 23/12/2008, from <http://164.100.24.209/news/maindet.asp>
- Mason, J. (2002). *Qualitative Researching*. London, California , New Delhi: Sage.
- Mattoo, R. (1998, July 30th , thursday). *A Project In Peril*. Retrieved December 23, 2008, from www.indianexpress.com: <http://www.indianexpress.com>
- Miles, M. B., & Huberman, M. A. (1994). *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*. Thousand Oaks; London; New Delhi, USA; UK; India: Sage Publications.
- Ministry of Civil Aviation, Govt. of India. (1991, 03 14). *Setting up of a Committee for examining alternative sites near Bangalore for the construction of a civilian airport of international standards*. Govt of India Order.

- New Delhi, India: Govt.on India; Ministry of Civil Aviation.
- (1992). Minutes of the Meeting of Special Core Group on evolving an Integrated Air Space Management and Report.
 - Mysore Sales International Limited. Report on Cargo Handled at Bangalore Air Cargo Complex.
 - National Airports Authority. (Undated). Criteria for the Selection of Site for New Aerodrome at Bangalore. Anx to Ramanathan Committee Report : Technical & Operational Parameters.
 - Nilekani, N. (2008). *Imagining India: Ideas for the New Century*. New Delhi, Indis: Penguin; AllenLane.
 - Olds, k. e. (1999). *Globalisation and the Asia-Pacific:Contested Territories*. New York: Routledge.
 - OneIndia News. (2007, 4 3). Bangalore airport work enters final stages. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from oneindia.in: <http://news.oneindia.in>
 - OneIndia News. (2007, 7 1). Bangalore: To operate HAL airport or not? Retrieved 1 9, 2009, from oneindia.in: <http://news.oneindia.in>
 - OneIndia News. (Sunday, June 10, 2007, Sunday, June 10, 2007 Sunday, June 10, 2007). Bangalore: To operate HAL airport or not? Retrieved 02 09, 2010, from oneindia: <http://news.oneindia.in/2007/06/10/bangalore-to-operate-hal-airport-or-not.html>
 - Osborne, S. P. (2000). Understanding public-private partnerships in international perspective: globally convergent or nationally divergent phenomena? In S. P. Osborne, *Public-private partnerships: Theory and Practice in international perspective* (pp. 1-6). Oxford; New York, UK;USA: Routledge.
 - Preliminary Report on Aerodrome Site: DEVANAHALLI.
 - PTI. (2008, 5 12). New Bangalore Airport to open soon. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from Times of India: <http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com>
 - Raghu, K., & Shukla, T. (2008, 7 23). AAI team wants Bangalore's old report reopened, ministry wary. Retrieved 12 18, 2008, from livemint: <http://www.livemint.com>
 - Rajya Sabha, Parliament of India. (2005). *Ninetieth Report on Development of Airport Sector with Special Emphasis on New Modern Airports*. Rajya Sabha Secretariat, Department -Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture. New Delhi: Rajya Sabha, Parliament of India.
 - Rajya Sabha, Parliament of India. (2008). *One Hundred and Thirty First Report on Closure of Bangalore and Hyderabad Airports and matters Related Thereto*. Rajya Sabha, Parliament of India, Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture. New Delhi: Rajya Sabha, Parliament of India.
 - Ramanathan, R. (2008, 2 11). Grounded at the word go. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from livemint: <http://www.livemint.com>
 - Rosenau, P. M. (2000). *Public-Private Policy Partnerships*. London; Cambridge, MA, USA; England: MIT Press.
 - Rudolph, L., & Rudolph, S. (2001, 5 5). Iconisation of Chandrababu Sharing Sovereignty in India's Federal Market Economy. *Economic & Political Weekly*, pp. 1541-1552.
 - S.Ramanathan. (6/1992). Report of the committee for recommending a site for a new airport at Bangalore. Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Civil Aviation. Bangalore: Government of India.
 - Secretary, Karnataka Legislative Assembly. (2008, 9 18). General Publication: Minor Publication Part- 2. 5. Bangalore, Karnataka, India: Government of Karnataka.
 - Secretary, Karnataka Legislative Assembly. (2008, 9 18). Minor Publication Part 2. Bangalore, Karnataka, India: Government of Karnataka.
 - Secretary, Karnataka Legislative Assembly Secretarial. (2008, 9 30(27)). Meeting Notice: FIRST meeting of JLC. 8. Bangalore, Karnataka, India: Government of Karnataka.
 - Sharma et al. (2008). BIAL: a dream come true or a dream gone sour? IIMB, IIMB. IIMB: IIMB.

- Sharma, Y. (2008). *Public Private Partnership in Infrastructure*. Vitasta Publishing.
- Shukla, T. (2008, 8 20). For aviation ministry, no case for opening old Bangalore airport. Retrieved 12 18, 2008, from livemint: <http://www.livemint.com>
- Sinha. (2005).
- Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District. (1991, 7 10). Selection of Site for a New Civilian Futuristic Airport at Bangalore. (2)SR.2./1991-92 Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, 1. Bangalore.
- Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore Sub-division, Bangalore. (1991, 7 6). Selection of Site for the New International Airport. 1.
- Staff Reporter. (Thursday, May 22, 2008). Notification to close down HAL Airport challenged. *The Hindu*.
- Stewart-Smith, M. (1995). Private Financing and Infrastructure Provision in Emerging Markets. *Law & Policy in International Business*, 26, 987-1011.
- Swyngedouw, E. (1989). The Heart of the Place: The Resurrection of Locality in an Age of Hyperspace. *Geographiska Annaler B*, 71 B (1), 31-42.
- Tahsildar , Sidlaghatta Taluk, Sidlaghatta. (1991, 07 10). Selection of Site for New Civilian Futuristic Airport at Bangalore. Official Letter from Tahsildar, Sidlaghatta Taluk, Sidlaghatta to Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District , 2. Bangalore.
- Tahsildar, Sidlaghatta Taluka. (1991). Selection for a New Civilian Futuristic Airport at Bangalore.
- Taraqqi. (2001, 3). Laws Relating to Economic Restructuring under Vajpayee Government. Taraqqi, pp. 1-6.
- TATA-Raytheon-Singapore Consortium. (6/1996). Feasibility Report for the New Bangalore International Airport. Feasibility Report, TRS Consortium, Bangalore.
- Times of India. (2006, 8 15). Expressway coming: Zip to airport. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from Times of India: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>
- Times of India. (2005, 9 2). Road work moves at snail pace. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from Times of India: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>
- TNN. (2007, 11 8). A tedious drive to the new airport. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from Times of India: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>
- TNN. (Mar 19 2010). Bench reserves verdict on HAL airport. *The Times of India*.
- TNN. (2008, 6 21). BSY to lobby for HAL airport. Retrieved 12 18, 2008, from Times of India: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>
- TNN. (2008, 3 10). City needs HAL airport. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from Times of India: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>
- TNN. (2008, 7 1). Now, you can heli-hop from BIA to office. Retrieved 12 18, 2008, from Times of India.
- TNN. (Aug 12, 2009). Reopening of HAL airport: HC seeks renegotiation report. *The Times of India*.
- UNI . (2006, 4 28). Military flights hit by commercial traffic at HAL airport. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from oneindia: <http://news.oneindia.in/2006/04/28>
- UNI. (2007, 7 12). BIAL for expansion; rejects second airport option. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from OneIndia: <http://news.oneindia.in>
- UNI. (2006, 12 12). B'lore airport may be operational by April 2008. Retrieved 12 23, 2008, from oneindia.in: <http://news.oneindia.in>
- Valluri, S. R. (2006, May Monday 19). The man who pioneered the step forward. Retrieved 02 03, 2010, from Sights, sounds and smells from Bangalore: <http://bangalorebuzz.blogspot.com/2008/05/man-who-pioneered-step-forward.html>
- Yin, R. K. (2003). *Case study research-design and methods* (Third ed.). Thousand Oaks; London; New Delhi, USA; UK; India: Sage.